Koch Brothers Firm, BP Targets of Terrorist Elicitation Attempt

Recently, the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) put out an alert warning that “ Terrorists or criminals may attempt to identify critical infrastructure vulnerabilities by eliciting information pertaining to operational and security procedures from security personnel, facility employees, and their associates. Persistent, intrusive or probing questions about security, operations or other sensitive aspects of a facility by individuals with no apparent need for the information could provide early warning of a potential attack.”
Based on the information provided, it is possible to say that the Koch Brothers Flint Hill Resources refinery in McFarland Wisconsin was a target of a possible Islamist terrorist targeting in late November 2008.

Newly declassified records show that on November 21, 2008, “an Arabic gentleman” posing as an investigator for an never identified Atlanta law firm. The caller, seeking information as to "whether Flint Hills could track where the gas tankers were going" had a particular interest in BP shipments. His refusal to give a last name or state which legal firm he was working made the answering Flint Hill Resources employee suspicious causing him to refuse to give out the requested information and call in the FBI which launched a highly-classified investigation.

The six-month investigation by the FBI was ultimately closed without charging or identifying anyone after the FBI's Milwaukee field office decided that it had "exhausted sufficient investigative resources" and that "no potential criminal violations or priority threats to national security warranting further investigation were identified."

Flint Hills Resources FBI File

"Rampant Corruption Among the Security Forces," Ineptitude Hindered Peruvian War on Terrorism

Information recently declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review to the Central Intelligence Agency reveals that “rampant corruption among the security forces” and “interservice rivalries” hampered the Peruvian war on terrorism in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Also discussed is the role of Libyan money played in supporting the organization which the CIA believes was behind a spike in the capabilities of Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which included as well as support to a wider-range of fellow terrorist organizations than the CIA was willing to publicly acknowledge. Support from MRTA was not only extended to Bolivian terrorists but also a terrorist group in Argentina and possibly elsewhere.

The CIA noted that the MRTA posed a challenge to the Sendero Luminoso, a larger, more rural terrorist organization operating in Peru at that time. The CIA believed that MRTA's successful attacks inside Lima and the publicity they generated were likely behind the uptick in violence by Sendero Luminoso occurring at that the time.

Finally, the CIA also reveal its organizational chart for the organization for the first time.See the full report below:

3/1991 CIA Report on the Tupac Amaru

CIA/ Mandela Porn: The Best CIA Documents About Nelson Mandela

In honor of the 22 anniversary of Nelson Mandela's release from prison, I have compiled from the CIA's publicly released archives, a collection of the most interesting documents and factoids available on or about Nelson Mandela.

In response to a Mandatory Declassification Review, the CIA processed a 9/26/1986 Directorate of Intelligence Report titled,” Nelson Mandela: What if Alive and Well and Free in South Africa [redacted].

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81311359/Mandela-Alive-and-Well-in-SA

 

The report reveals that Mandela, despite South African claims to the contrary, was not a Communist. Additionally, Mandela refused to renounce violence in order to secure his release from prison, preferring to remain in jail because he “almost certainly believes that his remaining in prison serves the black cause better than his accepting a conditional release. He evidently calculates that his continued imprisonment keeps international attention focused on the South Africa problem and discredits government reform efforts that do not include him.”

Another striking feature of the report is that Mandela was viewed as particularly close to death and there was an acute fear of him dying in prison.

Compare this version to the 2006 release version and you'll notice that despite the passage of twenty years and the deaths of many South African, African National Congress, and American figures related to this issue, we're still not allowed to know a single additional word of the report. In fact, the CIA released the document with zero new information declassified. The only difference is that the CIA switched the color of the redactions from black to a white.

One of the scenario likely contained within redactions of the above document is a renewed military campaign by the ANC. According to an article in the 4/8/1985 Terrorism Review, “if [Mandela] were to leave the country and actively resume his position as head of the ANC, many young blacks would follow him to fight under his leadership” and “ a reinvigorated ANC with Mandela at the helm might even cause a shift in attitudes among leaders of neighboring black states. They are currently are following a policy of cautious détente with Pretoria, but their hatred of apartheid could overcome fear of South African retribution if they believed the ANC's military campaign had a reasonable chance of success.”

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81311572/481985-Terrorism-Review

Here is the undated CIA profile of “Mike” "An Angry Young Black" supporter of Nelson Mandela. It is social/cultural history profile produced by the CIA on young black men in 1980s South Africa. 

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81311655/Mike-An-Angry-Young-Black

If this Mandela reader is giving a different view of Mandela, this is because you're seeing Mandela as the American and South African governments viewed and portrayed him at that time. He had yet to win. He was still a terrorist. The ANC was still a Soviet-backed terrorist organization.

Here is a 10/28/1961 Central Intelligence Bulletin reported on a sabotage campaign by the African National Congress which was called for by Mandela and which “would concentrate initially on telephone lines and government offices but later might include roadblocks and railroad sabotage.”

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81311955/10281961-Central-Intelligence-Bulletin

This 3/31/1979 National Intelligence Daily reports on the African National Congress's view that “terrorism, civil disorder, strikes, and propaganda are the only practical means now available to break down authority within South Africa.” It also reported that the ANC was receiving assistance from the Soviet Union, Cubans, and East Germany while possessing infrastructure in Mozambique, Zambia,  Tanzania, and Swaziland.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81312215/3311979-National-Intelligence-Daily-Cable

This NIE -94-4: Prospects for the South African Transition- is an estimative product on how the transaction from apartheid would occur. The US IC predicted a 1 in 20 chance which, the CIA believed "would push South Africa to the brink of anarchy" and lead the ANC to "resort to large-scale violence to protest such an outcome." This wasn't the only violence predicted by the CIA. This NIE is laden with violent end game scenarios resulting murder, mayhem, and bloodshed.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81315845/Prospects-for-the-South-African-Transition

In addition to the violence, this NIE is notable for calling out early Nelson Mandela's commitment to economic pragmatism. Too bad, Mandela's supporters didn't read this he smashed their hopes for economic justice. The CIA also predicted a 1 in 100 chance of an act of nuclear terrorism.

SNIE 73.2-85 Prospects for South Africa:  Stability, Reform, and Violence has very little about Mandela, but a great deal of information on the cultural, social, economic, and military situation.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81312510/SNIE-732-85-Prospects-for-South-Africa-Stability-Reform-And-Violence 

My favorite two factoids:

1. One in 8 South African whites were involved in the internal defense structure necessary to maintain apartheid in mid 1980s. 
2. Interestingly, black townships were built to facilitate white dominance. As documented by the NIE Township roads wide enough for a South African armored personnel carrier to make a U-turn, House built no closer than  a specified distance so as not to impede police weapons fire and to make it more difficult for a fugitive to evade authoritiesConvenient vantage points for police vehicles to gather and monitor wide areas of the townships.A distance between the boundaries of the township and main highways in the area that exceeded the range of a high-powered rifle, presumably to protect travelers from snipers and even errant police shots in the event of a serious disturbance.   

Libya's support to the African National Congress paid off when Mandela, grateful for Libyan assistance during the anti-apartheid struggle, called for the end of sanctions against the Qaddafi regime. South Africa also began to cultivate Libya as a market for South African goods.

9/9/1998 Sub-Saharan Africa: Seeking Pragmatic Relations with Rogue States

http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/81313403?access_key=key-2f6tijdx8fqhe0wmryye

SNIE 73-86 The African National Congress of South Africa: Organization, Communist Ties, and Short-Term Prospects contains a great deal of background information on the ANC and its organization allies.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81312855/SNIE-73-86-the-African-National-Congress-of-South-Africa-Organization-Communist-Ties-and-Short-Term-Prospects

Key highlights and fun factoids:

1. The ANC was "externally based and bureaucratically complex organization."
2. The CIA estimated a quarter of the ANC were also members of the South African Communist Party.
3. It also notes that Mandela didn't even hold an official position in the ANC despite being popularly viewed as its leader.

A Nuclear End to Apartheid

In NIE 94-4 Prospects for the South African Transition, the American Intelligence Community found that hardline white South Africans were plotting to steal uranium. The American IC predicted a 1 in 100 chance of an act of nuclear terrorism.

Scary.  How is that for some black history month learning?

South African Nuclear Terrorism

Arkan Declassified: What the CIA Was Willing to Disclosed

Željko Ražnatović aka Arkan was the most mediagenic, infamous, and well-known Serbian warlord. Married to glamorous turbo-folk singer Ceca, owner of a leading Serbian soccer team, and possessor of the best-trained thugs in all the Balkans, he had little competition in that regard.

In response to a recent FOIA request seeking "all previously released records" pertaining to Željko Ražnatović, the CIA released just two records. The first is a FBIS translation of a Slovenian media article titled, "Rape as a Means of Battle" in which the authors report on the allegations the rape warfare strategies employed by VRS forces in Bosnia were organized, approved, and defended at the very top. The second - and far more interesting document- is a copy of the portions of the CIA's April 1999 Terrorism Review dealing with possible anti-American violence spawned by the NATO intervention against Serb genocide in Kosovo.

While I honestly disbelieve that Arkan named his group the Serbian Terrorist Organization Resistance Movement (STOP). I do not disbelieve that Arkan had the capacity- probably an organized, named capacity-to strike at the United States. However, I doubt he would have used it to defend Serbia. I base it not only on his failure to use it, but also the fact that Arkan was about Arkan first. While Hungary, Macedonia, Croatia, and the rest of the Balkans might be willing to tolerate his criminal enterprises, none of them could or would tolerate terrorist attacks on its soil, much less directed  terrorism at it. A single Arkan ordered terrorist attack would meant the end of his lucrative rackets. Thus, why, in part, there were none.

Anyway, enjoy the files.

Arkan's (Available) CIA File

A Croatian, Culinary Clash

During the opening week of 1980, Chicago was the scene of an aborted terrorist campaign directed against Croatian emigres supportive of Yugoslavia. On January 4^th 1980, a bomb was discovered in the parking lot used by customers of the Golden Shell restaurant, which was patronized by Yugoslavs and located within an ethnic Croatian neighborhood. Around noon, January 5^th 1980, a Chicago employee sanitation was killed when an improvised explosive device placed in the alley behind the Continental Club detonated. Like the Golden Shell, the Continental Club was patronized largely by Yugoslavs.¹

The investigation made little progress. One of the biggest impediments appears to the fact that no claims of credit were received for the bombings and no communiques were issued. Upon, however, consultation with other FBI field offices and the initial examination of the crime scenes, Croatian National Resistance members were immediately suspected.² This initial impression was bolstered by a source who had “furnished reliable information,” the owner of the Golden Shell was disliked by Otpor members who disapproved of her decision to advertise on pro-Yugoslav radio shows. The source also informed the FBI that the Continental Club had occurred Otpor's disfavor because its ownership was pro-Yugoslav and Yugoslav diplomatic personnel were a common presence in the restaurant.³ Another “confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past” alerted the FBI that spoke with a [redacted] individual who told the Otpor member that the FBI had questioned her about Otpor and the [redacted] individual's relationship with it.

While the [redacted] (probably the owner or the manager of the Golden Shell) stated she had no problems with any Yugoslav groups prior to the bombing attempt⁴  [Redacted] reported that the [redacted] of the Golden Shell had been previously condemned over her decision to advertise the restaurant as “Yugoslav” as opposed to “Croatian” and she had been approached with demands to display pro-Croatian posters in the windows.⁵ 

The Continental Club had recently had a Yugoslav entertainer at the club, something that angered members of the Serbian and Croatian communities.⁶  On January 6^th, the Kragujevic Lounge received a threatening phone call from a male “Serbian” voice who shouted profanity over the loyalty to Tito at the [redacted] recipient of the phone call.⁷  Based on the prior two attacks, it appears an accurate, but not totally safe to bet this was a follow-up to the prior two attacks.

Ultimately, even a plan to employ hypnotism failed to produce any results in this investigation and judging from the file the investigation ended in 1981.  Below is almost all of the FBI file on the matter. Feel free to explore and possibly solve this mystery yourself.

NEWBOMB FBI File

11/6/1980 Memorandum from Chicago (field office) to Director Subject: ATTEMPTED BOMBING AT THE PARKING LOT OF THE GOLDEN SHELL RESTAURANT 1-3

2Chicago Field Office FD-263 for the period between 1/5-2/5/1980 Case” NEWBOM cover page B.

31/9/1980 FBI transcription of notes on witness interview

41/14/1980 transcript of witness interview notes Description of witness based on description of establishment as [hers]

5Transcribed notes from 1/14/1980 investigation by [redacted] SA

6Transcribed notes from 1/8/1980 investigation by [redacted] SA

71/8/1980 transcribed notes from interview with [redacted]

Document of the Week #15 CIA Report on Terrorist Attacks on American Business Abroad

In the hubbub spawned by the successful whacking of Osama Bin Laden, I totally forgot to post a Document of the Week. By the time I remembered to do so, it was already Thursday and I simply decided to shelve it until next week.

This Document of the Week is a June 1982 CIA report on terrorist attacks against American businesses aboard between January 1968 through December 1981. Twenty pages in length, the report includes several interesting graphs and numerous factoids that challenge the post-9/11 narrative that terrorism was unknown to the United States and its American inhabitants.

In the 14-year span covered by the report, the CIA noted there almost a thousand terrorist attacks against American business interests by foreign terrorists. Of the 953 attacks carried out by 98 different foreign terrorist organizations against American businesses, 144 of them caused casualties. The number of attacks increased from 1968 until they peaked in 1974 when they began a decline that was interrupted by an uptick in 1978 due to the events in Iran. During this time period, Argentina was the site of the most attacks against American businesses keeping with Latin America being the geographic location of the most attacks Argentinian terrorist organization Montoneros was the group responsible for the most terrorist attacks against American interests in the time period covered by the report. The Western Europe and the Middle East were each the locations of 18% of the total attacks followed by the North America (which includes the United States saw 16% of the total attacks.

This report does have some noticeable errors. A while back, I posted a similar CIA focused on skyjackings of American aircraft, which listed attacks by Croatian and Serbian nationalists groups opposed to the former Yugoslavia. This report lists and mentions  those acts (calling them skyjackings) but fails to list the groups responsible for them.

CIA Report on Terrorist Attacks on American Businesses

Skyjacking: A CIA Analysis and History

N.B.- I know that I have promised several of my readers that I was going to cut down on Scribd uploads. I intend to do so. However, I had already scanned this document and Google Documents refuses to accept it. Thus I have no choice.

As for the record itself, it is a July 1982 CIA study on “terrorist skyjacking”. The use of “Skyjacking” to describe airline hijackings makes this report worthwhile by itself because SKYJACKING is a boss word and deserves to be resurrected from its linguistic purgatory.

More seriously, this 24-page CIA report is a statistical study with historical commentary on the rise and prevalence of terrorist skyjackings and presumably garden-variety skyjackings since the first “terrorist skyjacking” took place in 1968 when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) seized an El-Al jet liner.(1) The CIA's statistics reveal a great deal of common wisdom challenging information:

As documented by the CIA, 9% of all terrorist attacks were skyjackings. The 684 skyjackings between 1968 and 1982 resulted in at least 500 deaths and 400 injuries. Of the 684 skyjackings, the CIA ruled 108 of them “terrorist skyjackings” and that these terrorist skyjackings. Among these 108, forty turned violent with the end result being 212 dead and 186 wounded.

So, contrary to popular wisdom, the pre-911 skyjackings were not necessarily safe nor simply affairs to draw media attention to one's cause or to procure the release of one's comrades.

While terrorist skyjackings were done by many groups for both attention and to secure the release of their members, the bulk of the hijackings were done by Palestinians.

Between 1968- July 1982:

Cuba was the most common diversion point. Cuba also granted safe haven to terrorist skyjackers the most often.

Lebanon was the most frequent point of origin for hijacked aircraft as well as the skyjackers' most frequently boarding point

While only 7% of skyjackings occurred in the North America, American aircraft were the most often skyjacked.

So again, the post-911 narrative that Americans had little experience with foreign terrorism is explicitly challenged and even debunked.

Sprinkled throughout the paper are some nifty graphics, one of which reveals a steep and briefly sustain drop-off in terrorist skyjackings in response to new security measures such as metal detectors.

On a final note, some caution is required when reading this report. The CIA itself admits to using “incomplete data” and I know that the CIA is incorrect in describing two incidents listed in this report.

First, only five Croatians were released during the 1972 hijacking in Sweden and secondly, only four Croatians and the American wife of the ringleader hijacked TWA-355 in September 1976.

Terrorist Skyjackings: A CIA Report

(1)Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 67

The FBI's Ustasha Stand Down Order

In January 1951, C.E. Hennrich, of the FBI, sent a memorandum to A.H. Belmont, of the FBI in which he argued that the FBI should “undertake no active investigation of Yugoslav immigrants and displaced persons who have been members of or associated with the Fascist Ustashi elements in World War II unless their activities after arriving in the United States appear to be inimical to the internal security.” Hennrich instead proposed that all “such allegations” be referred to INS for such action as is deemed advisable with the comment that the Bureau contemplates no investigation unless subsequent information indicates the subject's activities after arriving in the United Sates appear to be inimical to the internal security.” Hennrich stated that because of “the hatred between the Serbs and Croats,” which was “well-known,” and based on “political and religious difference which antecede World War II by many years.” and “the historical desire of the Croats for a separate state,” not all Ustashi were fascists. Hennrich also believed it was “expedient” for Croatians to support the German occupation and the Ustashi due to the former's occupation and the other's alliance with the Nazis.¹ No formal response to this memorandum can be found in the FBI records at the National Archives or amongst the records I have had declassified. However, the cases of Janko Tortic and Andrija

Artukovic reveals a pattern of FBI behavior that indicates that this proposal was implemented. I will blog about this case in a forthcoming post.  

Ustasha Stand Down Order

The Threat of Serbian Suicide Attacks

This August 1992 cable from the American Embassy in Belgrade reveals that the Bosnian Serbs openly threatened to conduct terrorist attacks against Western targets which included, but was not limited to nuclear power plants, using “kamikaze pilots” and “volunteers from friendly nations.” Who these volunteers were, assuming they existed is left unstated in the cable. I would presume they were, again assuming they were make-believe, members of the Serbian diaspora or Serbian underground in Europe, America, Australia, and elsewhere.

See the bottom of the second page of the PDF.

SerbianSuicide Attacks Cable

Newly Declassified COINTELPRO Files Detail Anti-Serbian Campaign

In the course of my thesis research, I had a FOIA request submitted to the FBI seeking their COINTELPRO records on its program directed against Yugoslav emigres. According to their FOIA website, the COINTELPRO files pertaining to Yugoslav (Violence Prone Yugoslav Emigres in U. S. ) amounted to just 84 pages. I thought the FOIA request that I had submitted would be quick and free, given my entitlement to the first 100 pages of duplication being without charge.

Much to my surprise and delight, the response to my request was substantially more than expected. I actually received 178 pages of records in total. Plus, with the exception of agent names, informant names, and the names of their unwitting targets, there is little redaction allowing for a detailed and accurate reconstruction of the COINTELPRO operations directed at the Serbian emigre community in the United States.

Analysis below comes from a portion of my yet to be completed thesis:

Another reason for the lackluster response by the American government to Ustasha activities was that Ustasha activities in the United States were limited and eclipsed by the more active (in America ) Serbian émigré groups.
The Serbian émigrés were active in the United States before the Ustasha movement’s splinter factions began to take center stage. In February 1966, eight Yugoslav embassies and consulates throughout the United States and Canada were bombed. The FBI affixed responsibility for the bombings on Serbian émigrés, through it never arrested anyone in connection with the attacks. However, by the beginning of 1969, the FBI, having grown weary with the Serbian émigré communities actions, had position itself to strike back those “who have frequently capitalized on the bombings to build their reputations with the Serbians”.

A COINTELPRO campaign directed against VIOLENCE PRONE-Yugoslav émigrés were launched. The purpose of this COINTELPRO operation was “to create a feeling of mistrust” toward violent émigrés. From the currently declassified files, it appears that the first operation directed at violent Serb émigrés occurred in early 1968. The initial operation was to clandestinely distribute a flyer from a faux Serbian émigré group condemn violence against Yugoslav. However, it appears from the released records that the operation in question was long in development raising questions about possible earlier COINTELPRO operations despite FBI claims that all remaining files on COINTELPRO operations directed at violence prone Yugoslav émigrés have been released.

In October 1969, the FBI launched a plan to flush out Serbian terrorists by conducting faux investigations designed to capitalize on Yugoslav émigrés fears, spawned by a series of violent assassinations believed by most to have been done by the Yugoslav government, and convince them that Yugoslav intelligence services had infiltrated their ranks and were plotting similar acts here in the United States. Fears that this operation might lead to the widespread rupturing of the Serbian community led to modifications of the program. There were also concerns that Serbian émigrés might respond with violence, fearing the Yugoslav government. However, approval was given for the operation with the Chicago field office being given orders to formulate a plan to achieve their campaign’s objective.

Croatian terrorist are not mentioned until February 1970 as a possible target of COINTELPRO attention and investigation. In a memorandum to the FBI office, the Chicago field office reports that it had “recently been involved in determining the extent of” Otpor which the Chicago field office believed was “inclined toward militant direct action.” Chicago field office recommends expanding the planned operation to include Croatian émigrés and organizations. The FBI director agreed.

Ultimately, the Croatians were dismissed as a threat to the American national security. The FBI San Francisco found no evidence that they either promoted or were planning any violent actions against the Yugoslav government. The office reported that Croatians passively demonstrated in front Yugoslav consulate and that had been “incidents” where individuals had protested against the presence of Yugoslav officials at Croatian social gatherings. San Francisco Field Office also reported that the Ustasha movement was weak and resorted to tactics such as founding numerous organizations to all of its members would then join, creating the illusion of political clout. Ultimately, the operation was aborted due to “paranoiac fear” among Yugoslav émigrés of assassination by Yugoslav intelligence which was bolstered by the FBI’s early interviews.

Yugoslav COINTELPRO Files