Arkan Declassified: What the CIA Was Willing to Disclosed

Željko Ražnatović aka Arkan was the most mediagenic, infamous, and well-known Serbian warlord. Married to glamorous turbo-folk singer Ceca, owner of a leading Serbian soccer team, and possessor of the best-trained thugs in all the Balkans, he had little competition in that regard.

In response to a recent FOIA request seeking "all previously released records" pertaining to Željko Ražnatović, the CIA released just two records. The first is a FBIS translation of a Slovenian media article titled, "Rape as a Means of Battle" in which the authors report on the allegations the rape warfare strategies employed by VRS forces in Bosnia were organized, approved, and defended at the very top. The second - and far more interesting document- is a copy of the portions of the CIA's April 1999 Terrorism Review dealing with possible anti-American violence spawned by the NATO intervention against Serb genocide in Kosovo.

While I honestly disbelieve that Arkan named his group the Serbian Terrorist Organization Resistance Movement (STOP). I do not disbelieve that Arkan had the capacity- probably an organized, named capacity-to strike at the United States. However, I doubt he would have used it to defend Serbia. I base it not only on his failure to use it, but also the fact that Arkan was about Arkan first. While Hungary, Macedonia, Croatia, and the rest of the Balkans might be willing to tolerate his criminal enterprises, none of them could or would tolerate terrorist attacks on its soil, much less directed  terrorism at it. A single Arkan ordered terrorist attack would meant the end of his lucrative rackets. Thus, why, in part, there were none.

Anyway, enjoy the files.

Arkan's (Available) CIA File

The Milosevic Files

A rapid method to procure documents from the CIA is limit your request to "previously released records." This means sacrificing your right to appeal and usually (but not always) receiving stuff in the public domain. Y

I recently submitted several such requests for Yugoslav leaders such as Milovan Djilas, Aleksandar Ranković, Slobodan Milosevic, Željko Ražnatović (Arkan), and Edvard Kardelj. In the cases of Djilas, Ranković, and Kardelj, I received significant numbers of hard-to-find documents relating to the men. My request for Arkan's files, I was given two documents a FBIS translation of a Slovenian newspaper article and a copy of a Terrorism Review."

In response to Milosevic, I received two "requester reports"- a one- page report and another eight page report. I am not sure how they were created, but they list every previously released document on Milosevic. I done some research on the CIA's websites. The check marks means you'll find it searching for "Milosevic" while the an "x" means you have to search for that specific document. No marks means you'll most likely have to order it up.

Milosevic Requester Report

Vladimir Seks Advocated for Terrorist Thug

Given the long-standing unpopularity of terrorists, it is highly unusual to find politicians that lobby on their behalf or actively promoting their importation into their nation. This make the following documents a rare find.

In 1994, at a point during the Homeland War when 1/3 of Croatia was occupied by Belgrade-backed rebel Serb forces,  a time when the Croatian economy was under severe stress,  at the tailend of the failed, ill-conceived Muslim-Croat War, Croatian Vice President Vladimir Seks found time in his schedule to lobby the United States Parole Commission on behalf Vinko Logarusic, informing Logarusic's case analyst that "the Republic of Croatia has no objections to Mr. Vinko Logarusic traveling to and from Croatia, on a single or continuing basis or any objections to his eventual permanent residency in the republic of Croatia.” As you can see from the second document in the PDF, this letter was a product of an effort by Logarusic to receive permission to travel to Croatia after his release.

Vinko Logarusic Blog Post File

Logarusic, as this 6/22/1994 letter from Logarusic's Case analyst to Senator Metzenbaum shows, was a vicious individual who "participated in a Croatian terrorist ring from 1975-1981 and were responsible for two murders, several attempted murders, approximately 15 bombings and attempted bombings, an international extortion scheme involving 50 United States victims and the transportation of weapons and explosive throughout the country. According to a "U.S. Attorneys report,” “the crimes committed by this terrorist were among some of the most violent ever committed in the United States over a sustained period of time".

Yet, Seks was willing to allow Logarusic to visit and live in Croatia.

Below are the rest of the records released by the United States Parole Commission in response to an appeal I had lodged.

Logarusic Parole Board File

Ivan Saric: A Short Biography

Ivan Saric's INSCOM file (or part of it). For some reason it is not included on the finding aids of the RG 319 IWG records. I acquired through a redirected FOIA request to INSCOM. I suspect because, according to this release, it only contained a brief half-paged blurb worth of biography. The page also a short biography of Gregorij Rožman, bishop of Ljubljana and collaborator with the Nazis, who, like Saric, escaped justice after the war.

Ivan Saric's NARA/ INSCOM File

A Croatian, Culinary Clash

During the opening week of 1980, Chicago was the scene of an aborted terrorist campaign directed against Croatian emigres supportive of Yugoslavia. On January 4^th 1980, a bomb was discovered in the parking lot used by customers of the Golden Shell restaurant, which was patronized by Yugoslavs and located within an ethnic Croatian neighborhood. Around noon, January 5^th 1980, a Chicago employee sanitation was killed when an improvised explosive device placed in the alley behind the Continental Club detonated. Like the Golden Shell, the Continental Club was patronized largely by Yugoslavs.¹

The investigation made little progress. One of the biggest impediments appears to the fact that no claims of credit were received for the bombings and no communiques were issued. Upon, however, consultation with other FBI field offices and the initial examination of the crime scenes, Croatian National Resistance members were immediately suspected.² This initial impression was bolstered by a source who had “furnished reliable information,” the owner of the Golden Shell was disliked by Otpor members who disapproved of her decision to advertise on pro-Yugoslav radio shows. The source also informed the FBI that the Continental Club had occurred Otpor's disfavor because its ownership was pro-Yugoslav and Yugoslav diplomatic personnel were a common presence in the restaurant.³ Another “confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past” alerted the FBI that spoke with a [redacted] individual who told the Otpor member that the FBI had questioned her about Otpor and the [redacted] individual's relationship with it.

While the [redacted] (probably the owner or the manager of the Golden Shell) stated she had no problems with any Yugoslav groups prior to the bombing attempt⁴  [Redacted] reported that the [redacted] of the Golden Shell had been previously condemned over her decision to advertise the restaurant as “Yugoslav” as opposed to “Croatian” and she had been approached with demands to display pro-Croatian posters in the windows.⁵ 

The Continental Club had recently had a Yugoslav entertainer at the club, something that angered members of the Serbian and Croatian communities.⁶  On January 6^th, the Kragujevic Lounge received a threatening phone call from a male “Serbian” voice who shouted profanity over the loyalty to Tito at the [redacted] recipient of the phone call.⁷  Based on the prior two attacks, it appears an accurate, but not totally safe to bet this was a follow-up to the prior two attacks.

Ultimately, even a plan to employ hypnotism failed to produce any results in this investigation and judging from the file the investigation ended in 1981.  Below is almost all of the FBI file on the matter. Feel free to explore and possibly solve this mystery yourself.

NEWBOMB FBI File

11/6/1980 Memorandum from Chicago (field office) to Director Subject: ATTEMPTED BOMBING AT THE PARKING LOT OF THE GOLDEN SHELL RESTAURANT 1-3

2Chicago Field Office FD-263 for the period between 1/5-2/5/1980 Case” NEWBOM cover page B.

31/9/1980 FBI transcription of notes on witness interview

41/14/1980 transcript of witness interview notes Description of witness based on description of establishment as [hers]

5Transcribed notes from 1/14/1980 investigation by [redacted] SA

6Transcribed notes from 1/8/1980 investigation by [redacted] SA

71/8/1980 transcribed notes from interview with [redacted]

NSA Article on the Tito-Stalin Split

Recently declassified NSA Cryptologic Quarterly article on the 1948 Tito- Stalin Split reveals that American signals intelligence was largely flying blind during the event due to the treachery of William Weisband who had revealed American successes against the Soviet Union to the USSR. Also revealed that still-classified SIGINT hints at new revelations regarding the decades old, Tito-Stalin Split to come.

NSA Article on TIto-Stalin Split

Document of the Week #19 FBI, State Department Tracked the Croatian Fraternal Union for Decades

When the first lodge of what would become the Croatian Fraternal Union of America was founded on January 14, 1894, it marked the beginning of a mutual support group and cultural association that would last well into the 21^st century.

It would also mark the creation of an organization that would spend much of the 20^th century under the gaze of American law enforcement. As the 8/30/1976 FBI telex to the State Department reveals, the FBI and the State Department were monitoring the Croatian Fraternal Union of America for decades, starting according to this record, in 1942. According to other records I saw in the FBI’s IWG files on the Ustashi, the Croatian Fraternal Union of America was investigated as early as 1940. Why would the Croatian Fraternal Union warrant decades of apparently intense FBI and State Department scrutiny?

The answer, which is based off of documents that I have seen but did not copy, is that the Croatian Fraternal Union of America was investigated as part of a broader investigation into organization that had ethnic, religious, cultural, or political ties to the Tripartite Pact powers. After the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia, this meant that Croatians were a suspect group in the United States. From surviving records, it appears that the Ustasha movement was the most intently investigated, but many Croatian groups were examined including the Croatian Peasant Party, the Croatian Catholic Union, and the Croatian Fraternal Union.

Once the war ended, much of this surveillance was stopped. For example, the FBI files on the Croatian Peasant Party and Croatian Catholic Church largely stop in 1945. I suspect, but cannot prove until I receive the documentation, is that the FBI continued monitoring the Croatian Fraternal Union due to allegations that the organization was “Communist” and had ties to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After the easing of the Red Scare, I suspect that the Croatian Fraternal Union was subjected to continued investigation for three reasons. During the late 1960s, Croatian militants became more strident in their calls for Croatian independence, even taking actions here in the United States. Judging from the FBI files of Croatian organizations that I have received via FOIA submitted on my behalf, the Croatian agitation reach a point that the FBI could no longer ignore in the 1967-1968 time frame and many of the large Croatian oriented groups were investigated. I suspect it then-ongoing relationship with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia led to a continued FBI interest in the Croatian Fraternal Union of America. Finally, the Croatian Fraternal Union would come under attack from some of the Croatian organizations actively seeking Yugoslavia’s destruction. Bernard Luketich received death threats that provided to be anything less than idle in the summer of 1977 when he was attacked by men with lead pipes. (2)

However, this is just semi-informed speculation until I receive the documentation

(1) An example of this is Dinko Šuljak's The Communist conspiracy in the Croatian Fraternal Union

(2) http://www.jasenovac-info.com/cd/biblioteka/pavelicpapers/ljubas/al0004.html

Ante Markovic's Throat Surgery and Its Greater Significance

Despite the concern over the political impact of his absence shown in this cable, I doubt the absence of Ante Markovic, the last prime minister of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, due to surgery for an unknown throat concern had much impact on the course of Yugoslav history.

However, one should consider this cable in the broader FOIA context. This document discusses the personal medical history of a still living individual and was released intact with no redactions.  In contrast, the FBI will not even considering releasing the FBI files of living individuals who have been tried and convicted within the federal court system. Nor will they release the FBI files of prominent

American leaders such as Joe Biden or Barack Obama despite the fact an argument can be made that their prominence and positions of authority overrule their b(6) privacy rights under FOIA.

Finally, does anyone know what Markovic's condition was? I cannot find any information on it in the secondary literature, any other declassified and released State Department cable, or memoir of a participant.

Croatian Dissident Bruno Busic's CIA Files

In response to a FOIA request I had submitted for the records of Croatian dissident nationalist and the manifesto writer for the hijackers of TWA-355 Bruno Busic, the CIA released fifteen pages of records (and invoked Glomar regarding the existence or non-existence of any other records), just finished intelligence reports, on him. The first document is a single page from the 21 September 1972 Eastern Europe Intelligencer in which the CIA reported that Busic, Franjo Tudjman, and another man were on trial, accused of working with “unspecified foreign intelligence service,” which in the case of Busic meant the CIA. The CIA also made note of Busic's contacts with emigre Croatian radicals.

The next document is the entire 14 December 1971 Central Intelligence Bulletin in which Busic was discussed. Sandwiched between a redacted in its entirety article and an article on the controversy very over the Soviet intention to open an embassy in Costa Rica is a page long article on the crackdown on Croatian nationalists by the Yugoslav government. At least thirty people, including Bruno Busic, were arrested and the Yugoslav government denounced their actions and threatened further interventions to maintain order. 

Bruno Busic's CIA Records

The Remnants of Edvard Kardelj's FBI File

Edvard Kardelj was a former vice-president of Yugoslavia, a senior Partisan commander, and one of the leading post-second-world-war Communist intellectuals. Despite this, on December 16, 2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigation destroyed all but fifteen pages of their records pertaining to him. According to the Bureau, the only records that survived are fifteen pages pertaining to the 9/29/1977- 10/5/1977 visit by Kardelj to the United States.

The records are worthless for scholarship due to the extensive redactions made to them on the b(1), that is the information according to the FOIA statute, is “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy”. Judging from the markings on the surviving documents, the information that is being redacted is classified “Secret” meaning its release would cause “serious damage” to American national security. In the FBI's opinion, I cannot be not allowed to see the FBI's information on Kardelj because it would compromise American national security, yet, somehow the same information can confined to the wastebasket without the least harm to American national security.

Edvard Kardelj's File File

CIA Thoughts on the Homeland and Bosnian Wars

The following NIEs on the Bosnian War and Homeland War were recently declassified and given to me by the CIA in response to a FOIA request that I had submitted.

 

NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]

Issued in May 1993, this nine- page, classified “Secret” document gives insight into the CIA's pessimistic view for Bosnia's prospects and of the Bosnian government. The document reveals that the

The CIA believed that maintaining Bosnia's integrity after the implementation of a Vance-Owen Plan would require a commitment of time and resources on par with that made to South Korea after the Korean War.

The CIA believed that the “Muslims” were capable of “creat[ing] violent incidents that could be blamed on the Serbs and Croats.”

And the language of the NIE also shows that the CIA held the Bosnian government as being little better than the VRS and HVO it fought. In addition to the above “Muslims” and “Serbs and Croats,” another part of the NIE referes to the “Bosnian Serb Army” and the “Muslim-dominated Bosnian Army.”

NIE 93-22 Prospects for Bosnia

Update Memorandum on NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]

This five- page memorandum, classified “Secret” is an update to the May 1993 NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]. The highlights of this document include

The CIA's belief that a Bosnia divided as intended by the Vance-Owen Plan would not survive long.

The CIA's opinion that the Europeans would not remained engage long in Bosnia if the United States refused to get involved.

Update Memo NIE-93-22

NIE 93-26 Croatia:When Will Fighting Resume?

This eleven-page, classified “Secret” document is a July 1993 National Intelligence Estimate on the probability of renewed warfare in Croatia during the lull in the Homeland War, the reaction of Serbia to such fighting, and the impact such violence would have on Bosnia, Croatia, and the world.

The CIA believed there was “less than even chance” of a peaceful settlement of the Homeland War and that the Croatians would hold if ti sensed progress in negotiations with the RSK.

The Croatian diaspora, particularly the “Herzegovinian Mafia”, were driving the HDZ and Franjo Tudjman's nationalist agenda,

The West's influence had and was continuing to keep the Croatians from restarting the Homeland War beyond the minor skirmishes.

Finally, it appears that the CIA was aware of Croatian military actions that appear to be mobilization and preparation for the Medak Pocket Operation.

NIE 93-26 Croatia:When Will Fighting Resume?

NIE 93-23/I Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia

This thirteen-page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the first part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. Among the more interesting points contained with this document are:

The horrible CIA-produced map on page 4 of the Estimate

The CIA's referral to the Bosnian government as “factional leaders” on par with the HVO and VRS.

The CIA's belief that the Bosnian government would attacks Western targets and frame the Serbs.

The CIA's ultimately mistaken belief that the HVO, with Croatian military assistance, could hold on to captured territory indefinitely.

The attention given to the possible threat to Serbia's neighbors by that nation's military force. The CIA estimated that Macedonia, Hungry, and Bulgaria would all need outside assistance to beat Serbia while the much larger Romanian military

NIE 93-23/I Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia

NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia\II

This sixty-eight page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the concluding part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. It has more detailed analysis of the points brought up in volume I of NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia.

The most interesting aspect of this document is the attention given to the prospect for terrorism by or on behalf of the Bosnian government Or the “Bosnian Muslims” as the CIA would term it while ignoring prior acts of Serbian terrorism such as the bombings and hijackings by individuals such as Nikola Kavaja and the limited description of Croatian terrorism such as the 1980 bombing of the Statue of Liberty and the 9/10 Hijacking of TWA-355 both acts which were intended to bring about an independent Croatian state.

NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia Volume II

The FBI's Ustasha Stand Down Order

In January 1951, C.E. Hennrich, of the FBI, sent a memorandum to A.H. Belmont, of the FBI in which he argued that the FBI should “undertake no active investigation of Yugoslav immigrants and displaced persons who have been members of or associated with the Fascist Ustashi elements in World War II unless their activities after arriving in the United States appear to be inimical to the internal security.” Hennrich instead proposed that all “such allegations” be referred to INS for such action as is deemed advisable with the comment that the Bureau contemplates no investigation unless subsequent information indicates the subject's activities after arriving in the United Sates appear to be inimical to the internal security.” Hennrich stated that because of “the hatred between the Serbs and Croats,” which was “well-known,” and based on “political and religious difference which antecede World War II by many years.” and “the historical desire of the Croats for a separate state,” not all Ustashi were fascists. Hennrich also believed it was “expedient” for Croatians to support the German occupation and the Ustashi due to the former's occupation and the other's alliance with the Nazis.¹ No formal response to this memorandum can be found in the FBI records at the National Archives or amongst the records I have had declassified. However, the cases of Janko Tortic and Andrija

Artukovic reveals a pattern of FBI behavior that indicates that this proposal was implemented. I will blog about this case in a forthcoming post.  

Ustasha Stand Down Order

The Lack of a Post- Milosevic NIE and What it Means

Without a doubt, once Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown, the American focus on the former Yugoslavia rapidly began to wane. This trend was furthered by the timing of Milosevic’s overthrow which occurred just a month before the 2000 American elections which eventually brought George W. Bush and a stated disdain for both the American interventions in the Balkans specifically and nation-building more generally into power. 9-11 accelerated the disengagement and made it permanent.


Confirming this is a final response letter recently sent out by the CIA in which they admit to having created no National Intelligence Estimates between 10/2000 and 10/2001 on Serbia or the rump Yugoslavia. NIEs are described by the CIA as being, “the most authoritative written judgment concerning a national security issue prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence” and “are addressed to the highest level of policymakers-up to and including the President.” The creation of a NIE indicates significant interest from senior American leaders. While the lack of a NIE does not mean a total disengagement from an issue, it does indicate a less priority and importance has been placed upon it
 
CIA No Record Response

Branko Peshelj's Newly Released FBI Files

Branko Peshelj was a member of the Croatian Peasant Party and advisor to its long time leader Vladko Macek. He was also an American government employee and informant to the FBI. Combined this makes him one of the more important Croatian emigres during the post-Second World War period.

However, only a portion of his FBI files were released as part of Interagency Working Group efforts. Back when I was doing archival research, I pressed the NARA staff to release for more of his records. This summer, I achieved the success seen below. I was also informed another of Peshelj's FBI files was being dispatched to NARA. While this will force me to miss work to hop over there and acquire it, it just seems tacky, after all my bitching, not to grab it.

New Branko Peshelj Files

Milovan Djilas' State Department Obituary

Here is the United States State Department’s “obituary” for famed Yugoslav Communist Leader Milovan Djilas.

United States State Department Cable Regarding the Death of Djilas

This 4/21/1995 cable from the US Embassy in Belgrade is succinct, poignant, and a complete contrast how the US Embassy in Belgrade treated Djilas while he was alive. As noted by Warren Zimmerman, the last Ambassador to Tito’s Yugoslavia, it was American policy not recognize Djilas so long as Tito was alive. This policy survived Tito. It was not until Zimmerman that Djilas actually met with the American ambassador.

America has a Communist -style Education Funding System & Other More Serious Things About Yugoslav Students

This is a CIA study of Yugoslav university students and youth written in the summer of 1968 according to 5/7/1973 Memorandum to the DCI regarding the broader report this paper of which this document was a portion. This document was reported to exist when the CIA released its infamous "Crown Jewels" collection I have a limited amount of time, so I am only going to hit the report’s highlights:

A)The report notes the age range of the Partisan generation which at the time of the report range from the leadership like Tito being well into their seventies and eighties while at the tail end there were individuals still in their forties. (pg.4)

B)Interestingly, Yugoslav schools and American schools are funded via the same primary means- local taxes. Just like in America, areas of Yugoslavia with high levels of wealth had high quality schools, while economically disadvantaged areas had inferior educational opportunities (pg.9)

A personal note, I intend to criticize everyone I know who mindlessly favors local control of education as being a "Commie" and by citing this report.

C)Something else I found noteworthy- Yugoslavia reduced the student loan burdens of university students who rapidly completed their studies. Given the white hot mess that Yugoslav higher education come be, it’s not easy to say if that was a good idea or would be a good idea in the United States, but I think it might be worthwhile to examine it as a student loan reform here in the United States. (pg.9)

D)Finally, the students of Sarajevo rioted along with the students of Belgrade. (pg.10)

A CIA 1968 Study of Yugoslav Youth

The NSA and the NIEs on Yugoslavia

I have submitted FOIA requests to the NSA for their records regarding all the National Intelligence Estimates that were done on Yugoslavia after the creation of the NSA in 1952. Without fail, they fire back no records responses. Interesting.

Commies in the US Army

Yes, there were godless Communists in the United States Army. However, they did not worm their way into our beloved armed forces using guile and deception. They were invited.

During the Cold War, the United States attempted to woo Yugoslavia into the NATO/Western powers camp through economic and even military assistance. One form of military assistance offered was the training JNA officers in US military schools such as Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Among the attendees was Veljko Kadijević who completed the school in 1963 and Lt. Col. Pasmiz Ramusovic(SP?*) who attended in 1965. Below is his Invitational Orders from the US Army detailing to Ramusovic the conditions of his involvement, what he needed, and was expected of him.


(*)As you will see, the documents were a blurry mess.

Ramusovic Orders

Newly Declassified COINTELPRO Files Detail Anti-Serbian Campaign

In the course of my thesis research, I had a FOIA request submitted to the FBI seeking their COINTELPRO records on its program directed against Yugoslav emigres. According to their FOIA website, the COINTELPRO files pertaining to Yugoslav (Violence Prone Yugoslav Emigres in U. S. ) amounted to just 84 pages. I thought the FOIA request that I had submitted would be quick and free, given my entitlement to the first 100 pages of duplication being without charge.

Much to my surprise and delight, the response to my request was substantially more than expected. I actually received 178 pages of records in total. Plus, with the exception of agent names, informant names, and the names of their unwitting targets, there is little redaction allowing for a detailed and accurate reconstruction of the COINTELPRO operations directed at the Serbian emigre community in the United States.

Analysis below comes from a portion of my yet to be completed thesis:

Another reason for the lackluster response by the American government to Ustasha activities was that Ustasha activities in the United States were limited and eclipsed by the more active (in America ) Serbian émigré groups.
The Serbian émigrés were active in the United States before the Ustasha movement’s splinter factions began to take center stage. In February 1966, eight Yugoslav embassies and consulates throughout the United States and Canada were bombed. The FBI affixed responsibility for the bombings on Serbian émigrés, through it never arrested anyone in connection with the attacks. However, by the beginning of 1969, the FBI, having grown weary with the Serbian émigré communities actions, had position itself to strike back those “who have frequently capitalized on the bombings to build their reputations with the Serbians”.

A COINTELPRO campaign directed against VIOLENCE PRONE-Yugoslav émigrés were launched. The purpose of this COINTELPRO operation was “to create a feeling of mistrust” toward violent émigrés. From the currently declassified files, it appears that the first operation directed at violent Serb émigrés occurred in early 1968. The initial operation was to clandestinely distribute a flyer from a faux Serbian émigré group condemn violence against Yugoslav. However, it appears from the released records that the operation in question was long in development raising questions about possible earlier COINTELPRO operations despite FBI claims that all remaining files on COINTELPRO operations directed at violence prone Yugoslav émigrés have been released.

In October 1969, the FBI launched a plan to flush out Serbian terrorists by conducting faux investigations designed to capitalize on Yugoslav émigrés fears, spawned by a series of violent assassinations believed by most to have been done by the Yugoslav government, and convince them that Yugoslav intelligence services had infiltrated their ranks and were plotting similar acts here in the United States. Fears that this operation might lead to the widespread rupturing of the Serbian community led to modifications of the program. There were also concerns that Serbian émigrés might respond with violence, fearing the Yugoslav government. However, approval was given for the operation with the Chicago field office being given orders to formulate a plan to achieve their campaign’s objective.

Croatian terrorist are not mentioned until February 1970 as a possible target of COINTELPRO attention and investigation. In a memorandum to the FBI office, the Chicago field office reports that it had “recently been involved in determining the extent of” Otpor which the Chicago field office believed was “inclined toward militant direct action.” Chicago field office recommends expanding the planned operation to include Croatian émigrés and organizations. The FBI director agreed.

Ultimately, the Croatians were dismissed as a threat to the American national security. The FBI San Francisco found no evidence that they either promoted or were planning any violent actions against the Yugoslav government. The office reported that Croatians passively demonstrated in front Yugoslav consulate and that had been “incidents” where individuals had protested against the presence of Yugoslav officials at Croatian social gatherings. San Francisco Field Office also reported that the Ustasha movement was weak and resorted to tactics such as founding numerous organizations to all of its members would then join, creating the illusion of political clout. Ultimately, the operation was aborted due to “paranoiac fear” among Yugoslav émigrés of assassination by Yugoslav intelligence which was bolstered by the FBI’s early interviews.

Yugoslav COINTELPRO Files

A Real LIfe Burn Notice: Krunoslav Draganovic's Burn Notice

My favorite show is Burn Notice. The premise of the show is that the lead character, a former CIA spy named Michael Westen, was "burnt" (a burnt spy is one who is fired and transformed into a pariah) as part of an effort to recruit him into a still unknown or unknown covert conspiracy against enemies and enemies unknown. As of about midway through season four, Westen has made some progress in discovering in why he was burnt, who burnt him, and why he was burnt.

The title of the show Burn Notice comes from the document issued when a spy of individual is burnt by the intelligence community. A Burn Notice is issued when a person proves untrustworthy, dangerous to the American intelligence community after previously worthy, or just becomes a dangerous nuisance. Below is a US Army CIC “burn notice” for Krunoslav Draganovic, a Croatian priest, member of the Ustasha movement, and US Army CIC asset directed against Yugoslavia during the early portion of the Cold War. Draganovic will initially come to US Army CIC attention during the early days of the Cold War. He was evacuating members of the Ustasha movement from Europe to destinations such as Argentina. Later, Draganovic was employed by the US Army to evacuate Klaus Barbie from Europe. Eventually, Draganovic became a target of US intelligence and an asset for the US Army CIC. (*)

That was true until 1962 as shown by this Burn Notice, Krunoslav Draganovic was burnt by the US Army CIC for reasons of security, demands of support for his fellow Croatian terrorists, and simply not being controllable. While his activities were still monitored by American intelligence, he ceased to be a source.

Krunoslav Draganovic's Burn Notice

(*) This post is based off of reports in Draganovic's CIA Name File, Paul Hockenos' Homeland Calling, and John Loftus and Mark Aarons' Unholy Trinity.