Showing posts with label Libya. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Libya. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

"Rampant Corruption Among the Security Forces," Ineptitude Hindered Peruvian War on Terrorism


Information recently declassified in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review to the Central Intelligence Agency reveals that “rampant corruption among the security forces” and “interservice rivalries” hampered the Peruvian war on terrorism in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Also discussed is the role of Libyan money played in supporting the organization which the CIA believes was behind a spike in the capabilities of Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which included as well as support to a wider-range of fellow terrorist organizations than the CIA was willing to publicly acknowledge. Support from MRTA was not only extended to Bolivian terrorists but also a terrorist group in Argentina and possibly elsewhere.

The CIA noted that the MRTA posed a challenge to the Sendero Luminoso, a larger, more rural terrorist organization operating in Peru at that time. The CIA believed that MRTA's successful attacks inside Lima and the publicity they generated were likely behind the uptick in violence by Sendero Luminoso occurring at that the time.

Finally, the CIA also reveal its organizational chart for the organization for the first time.See the full report below:

3/1991 CIA Report on the Tupac Amaru                                                            

Saturday, February 11, 2012

CIA/ Mandela Porn: The Best CIA Documents About Nelson Mandela

In honor of the 22 anniversary of Nelson Mandela's release from prison, I have compiled from the CIA's publicly released archives, a collection of the most interesting documents and factoids available on or about Nelson Mandela.

In response to a Mandatory Declassification Review, the CIA processed a 9/26/1986 Directorate of Intelligence Report titled,” Nelson Mandela: What if Alive and Well and Free in South Africa [redacted].
http://www.scribd.com/doc/81311359/Mandela-Alive-and-Well-in-SA
 
The report reveals that Mandela, despite South African claims to the contrary, was not a Communist. Additionally, Mandela refused to renounce violence in order to secure his release from prison, preferring to remain in jail because he “almost certainly believes that his remaining in prison serves the black cause better than his accepting a conditional release. He evidently calculates that his continued imprisonment keeps international attention focused on the South Africa problem and discredits government reform efforts that do not include him.”

Another striking feature of the report is that Mandela was viewed as particularly close to death and there was an acute fear of him dying in prison.

Compare this version to the 2006 release version and you'll notice that despite the passage of twenty years and the deaths of many South African, African National Congress, and American figures related to this issue, we're still not allowed to know a single additional word of the report. In fact, the CIA released the document with zero new information declassified. The only difference is that the CIA switched the color of the redactions from black to a white.

One of the scenario likely contained within redactions of the above document is a renewed military campaign by the ANC. According to an article in the 4/8/1985 Terrorism Review, “if [Mandela] were to leave the country and actively resume his position as head of the ANC, many young blacks would follow him to fight under his leadership” and “ a reinvigorated ANC with Mandela at the helm might even cause a shift in attitudes among leaders of neighboring black states. They are currently are following a policy of cautious détente with Pretoria, but their hatred of apartheid could overcome fear of South African retribution if they believed the ANC's military campaign had a reasonable chance of success.”

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81311572/481985-Terrorism-Review

Here is the undated CIA profile of “Mike” "An Angry Young Black" supporter of Nelson Mandela. It is social/cultural history profile produced by the CIA on young black men in 1980s South Africa. 

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81311655/Mike-An-Angry-Young-Black

If this Mandela reader is giving a different view of Mandela, this is because you're seeing Mandela as the American and South African governments viewed and portrayed him at that time. He had yet to win. He was still a terrorist. The ANC was still a Soviet-backed terrorist organization.

Here is a 10/28/1961 Central Intelligence Bulletin reported on a sabotage campaign by the African National Congress which was called for by Mandela and which “would concentrate initially on telephone lines and government offices but later might include roadblocks and railroad sabotage.”

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81311955/10281961-Central-Intelligence-Bulletin

This 3/31/1979 National Intelligence Daily reports on the African National Congress's view that “terrorism, civil disorder, strikes, and propaganda are the only practical means now available to break down authority within South Africa.” It also reported that the ANC was receiving assistance from the Soviet Union, Cubans, and East Germany while possessing infrastructure in Mozambique, Zambia,  Tanzania, and Swaziland.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81312215/3311979-National-Intelligence-Daily-Cable

This NIE -94-4: Prospects for the South African Transition- is an estimative product on how the transaction from apartheid would occur. The US IC predicted a 1 in 20 chance which, the CIA believed "would push South Africa to the brink of anarchy" and lead the ANC to "resort to large-scale violence to protest such an outcome." This wasn't the only violence predicted by the CIA. This NIE is laden with violent end game scenarios resulting murder, mayhem, and bloodshed.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81315845/Prospects-for-the-South-African-Transition

In addition to the violence, this NIE is notable for calling out early Nelson Mandela's commitment to economic pragmatism. Too bad, Mandela's supporters didn't read this he smashed their hopes for economic justice. The CIA also predicted a 1 in 100 chance of an act of nuclear terrorism.

SNIE 73.2-85 Prospects for South Africa:  Stability, Reform, and Violence has very little about Mandela, but a great deal of information on the cultural, social, economic, and military situation.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81312510/SNIE-732-85-Prospects-for-South-Africa-Stability-Reform-And-Violence 

My favorite two factoids:
  1. One in 8 South African whites were involved in the internal defense structure necessary to maintain apartheid in mid 1980s. 
  2. Interestingly, black townships were built to facilitate white dominance. As documented by the NIE Township roads wide enough for a South African armored personnel carrier to make a U-turn, House built no closer than  a specified distance so as not to impede police weapons fire and to make it more difficult for a fugitive to evade authoritiesConvenient vantage points for police vehicles to gather and monitor wide areas of the townships.A distance between the boundaries of the township and main highways in the area that exceeded the range of a high-powered rifle, presumably to protect travelers from snipers and even errant police shots in the event of a serious disturbance.   

Libya's support to the African National Congress paid off when Mandela, grateful for Libyan assistance during the anti-apartheid struggle, called for the end of sanctions against the Qaddafi regime. South Africa also began to cultivate Libya as a market for South African goods.
9/9/1998 Sub-Saharan Africa: Seeking Pragmatic Relations with Rogue States
http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/81313403?access_key=key-2f6tijdx8fqhe0wmryye

SNIE 73-86 The African National Congress of South Africa: Organization, Communist Ties, and Short-Term Prospects contains a great deal of background information on the ANC and its organization allies.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81312855/SNIE-73-86-the-African-National-Congress-of-South-Africa-Organization-Communist-Ties-and-Short-Term-Prospects

Key highlights and fun factoids:
  1. The ANC was "externally based and bureaucratically complex organization."
  2. The CIA estimated a quarter of the ANC were also members of the South African Communist Party.
  3. It also notes that Mandela didn't even hold an official position in the ANC despite being popularly viewed as its leader.

Sunday, March 27, 2011

Document of the Week #10 CIA Study on Pariah States and Sub-Saharan African Governments

If you're curious as to why the African Union and other Sub-Saharan African governments have provided so much support for Qaddafi and his efforts to maintain power check out this 9/9/1998 Intelligence Report from the CIA's Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis titled Sub-Saharan Africa: Seeking Pragmatic Relations with Rogue States.

CIA report on  Sub-Saharan African states relations with Libya and Other Rogue States                                                            

Sunday, March 6, 2011

Document of the Week #7 CIA Study of Widespread Arab Protests from 1980


With popular protests having defeated the authoritarian regimes that once held power in Egypt and Tunisia and (hopefully) bringing the reign of Qaddafi to a terminal conclusion, speculate on which regime will fall next. Much of the speculation focuses on the remaining tyrants in the Maghreb and those on the Arabian Peninsula.

In light of this discussion, I present to you Dissidents in the Arabian Peninsula by the [redacted] analyst(s) with the Office of Political Analysis. In this 24-page study, the CIA documented the activities of anti-regime dissidents, the response of regimes to these activities, and the influence of outside factors such as exile and foreign government support. Based on this study, the following reaction to popular protest and rebellion can be expected from Arabian Peninsula regimes:
  1. Arabian Peninsula regimes like the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia will employ their wealth to temper down opposition. This has already been seen in Bahrain where the King has given out cash payments to his subjects.
  2. Renewed and increased security cooperation between Arabian Peninsula governments particularly those in the Gulf Community Council. Dissidents will no longer find the same level of tolerance in exile as they have previously.
  3. Iran will be of a great concern due to their size and shared religion with the large number of Shia Muslims in Bahrain, Eastern Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.
However, in reading this document, remember the following differences:
  1. Neighboring nations, most notably Egypt, have successfully booted out their entrench dictators.
  2. The countries and entities that fueled the revolts and protests in the document are under pressure themselves. Libya is in the midst a full-scale revolt teetering on civil war, while Iran and the PLO (Palestinian Authority) are facing their own popular revolts. 

    DISSIDENTS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA                                                                   

Sunday, February 20, 2011

Document of the Week #5 Qaddafi's Borderless Wrath

Facing what may be the most serious challenge to his reign since seizing power in 1969, Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi is, not surprisingly, lashing out at his opposition with a great deal of force, with reports of snipers, mercenaries, and the military all being deployed to smash those aligned against him. This is keeping with Kaddafi's style which at one time included dispatching his security and intelligence apparatus abroad to hunt down and eliminate exile opposition and to monitor the Libyan diaspora in order to thwart and deter the formation of threats to his regime.


This Document of the Week is a 12/15/1993 Counterterrorist Center Commentary from the Director of Central Intelligence’s Counterterrorist Center regarding the disappearance of Mansur Kikhia who was mostly likely abducted by Libyan security services while in Cairo for a meeting of a Arab human rights group and with members of his family. Mansur Kikhia's disappearance has never been resolved, nor have many of the assassinations and vanishings of other exiled Libyan leaders, activists, and opponents of Qaddafi's regime.  

If Qaddafi survive, inevitably those opposing him will be driven into exile and likely hunted in a renewed effort to stamp out diasporic opposition to the Libyan dictator. 

12/15/1993 CIA Report Regarding Mansur Kikhia