Given the long-standing unpopularity of terrorists, it is highly unusual to find politicians that lobby on their behalf or actively promoting their importation into their nation. This make the following documents a rare find.
In 1994, at a point during the Homeland War when 1/3 of Croatia was occupied by Belgrade-backed rebel Serb forces, a time when the Croatian economy was under severe stress, at the tailend of the failed, ill-conceived Muslim-Croat War, Croatian Vice President Vladimir Seks found time in his schedule to lobby the United States Parole Commission on behalf Vinko Logarusic, informing Logarusic's case analyst that "the Republic of Croatia has no objections to Mr. Vinko Logarusic traveling to and from Croatia, on a single or continuing basis or any objections to his eventual permanent residency in the republic of Croatia.” As you can see from the second document in the PDF, this letter was a product of an effort by Logarusic to receive permission to travel to Croatia after his release.
Logarusic, as this 6/22/1994 letter from Logarusic's Case analyst to Senator Metzenbaum shows, was a vicious individual who "participated in a Croatian terrorist ring from 1975-1981 and were responsible for two murders, several attempted murders, approximately 15 bombings and attempted bombings, an international extortion scheme involving 50 United States victims and the transportation of weapons and explosive throughout the country. According to a "U.S. Attorneys report,” “the crimes committed by this terrorist were among some of the most violent ever committed in the United States over a sustained period of time".
Yet, Seks was willing to allow Logarusic to visit and live in Croatia.
Below are the rest of the records released by the United States Parole Commission in response to an appeal I had lodged.
During the opening week of 1980, Chicago was the scene of an aborted terrorist campaign directed against Croatian emigres supportive of Yugoslavia. On January 4th 1980, a bomb was discovered in the parking lot used by customers of the Golden Shell restaurant, which was patronized by Yugoslavs and located within an ethnic Croatian neighborhood. Around noon, January 5th 1980, a Chicago employee sanitation was killed when an improvised explosive device placed in the alley behind the Continental Club detonated. Like the Golden Shell, the Continental Club was patronized largely by Yugoslavs.1
The investigation made little progress. One of the biggest impediments appears to the fact that no claims of credit were received for the bombings and no communiques were issued. Upon, however, consultation with other FBI field offices and the initial examination of the crime scenes, Croatian National Resistance members were immediately suspected.2 This initial impression was bolstered by a source who had “furnished reliable information,” the owner of the Golden Shell was disliked by Otpor members who disapproved of her decision to advertise on pro-Yugoslav radio shows. The source also informed the FBI that the Continental Club had occurred Otpor's disfavor because its ownership was pro-Yugoslav and Yugoslav diplomatic personnel were a common presence in the restaurant.3 Another “confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past” alerted the FBI that spoke with a [redacted] individual who told the Otpor member that the FBI had questioned her about Otpor and the [redacted] individual's relationship with it.
While the [redacted] (probably the owner or the manager of the Golden Shell) stated she had no problems with any Yugoslav groups prior to the bombing attempt4 [Redacted] reported that the [redacted] of the Golden Shell had been previously condemned over her decision to advertise the restaurant as “Yugoslav” as opposed to “Croatian” and she had been approached with demands to display pro-Croatian posters in the windows.5
The Continental Club had recently had a Yugoslav entertainer at the club, something that angered members of the Serbian and Croatian communities.6 On January 6th, the Kragujevic Lounge received a threatening phone call from a male “Serbian” voice who shouted profanity over the loyalty to Tito at the [redacted] recipient of the phone call.7 Based on the prior two attacks, it appears an accurate, but not totally safe to bet this was a follow-up to the prior two attacks.
Ultimately, even a plan to employ hypnotism failed to produce any results in this investigation and judging from the file the investigation ended in 1981. Below is almost all of the FBI file on the matter. Feel free to explore and possibly solve this mystery yourself.
Working my way through my thesis material collection, I happened upon this Office of Strategic Services (OSS) report on the Croatian Fraternal Union. Officially undated, textual clues hint that it was created some time after March 1942. The report is on an internal power struggle between factions of the CFU over issues of leadership.
This surveillance of the Croatian Fraternal Union is less surprising given the alliance between the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and Nazi Germany.
When the first lodge of what would become the Croatian Fraternal Union of America was founded on January 14, 1894, it marked the beginning of a mutual support group and cultural association that would last well into the 21st century.
It would also mark the creation of an organization that would spend much of the 20th century under the gaze of American law enforcement. As the 8/30/1976 FBI telex to the State Department reveals, the FBI and the State Department were monitoring the Croatian Fraternal Union of America for decades, starting according to this record, in 1942. According to other records I saw in the FBI’s IWG files on the Ustashi, the Croatian Fraternal Union of America was investigated as early as 1940. Why would the Croatian Fraternal Union warrant decades of apparently intense FBI and State Department scrutiny?
The answer, which is based off of documents that I have seen but did not copy, is that the Croatian Fraternal Union of America was investigated as part of a broader investigation into organization that had ethnic, religious, cultural, or political ties to the Tripartite Pact powers. After the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia, this meant that Croatians were a suspect group in the United States. From surviving records, it appears that the Ustasha movement was the most intently investigated, but many Croatian groups were examined including the Croatian Peasant Party, the Croatian Catholic Union, and the Croatian Fraternal Union.
Once the war ended, much of this surveillance was stopped. For example, the FBI files on the Croatian Peasant Party and Croatian Catholic Church largely stop in 1945. I suspect, but cannot prove until I receive the documentation, is that the FBI continued monitoring the Croatian Fraternal Union due to allegations that the organization was “Communist” and had ties to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After the easing of the Red Scare, I suspect that the Croatian Fraternal Union was subjected to continued investigation for three reasons. During the late 1960s, Croatian militants became more strident in their calls for Croatian independence, even taking actions here in the United States. Judging from the FBI files of Croatian organizations that I have received via FOIA submitted on my behalf, the Croatian agitation reach a point that the FBI could no longer ignore in the 1967-1968 time frame and many of the large Croatian oriented groups were investigated. I suspect it then-ongoing relationship with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia led to a continued FBI interest in the Croatian Fraternal Union of America. Finally, the Croatian Fraternal Union would come under attack from some of the Croatian organizations actively seeking Yugoslavia’s destruction. Bernard Luketich received death threats that provided to be anything less than idle in the summer of 1977 when he was attacked by men with lead pipes. (2)
However, this is just semi-informed speculation until I receive the documentation
(1) An example of this is Dinko Šuljak's The Communist conspiracy in the Croatian Fraternal Union
In the course of my thesis research, I had a FOIA request submitted to the FBI seeking their COINTELPRO records on its program directed against Yugoslav emigres. According to their FOIA website, the COINTELPRO files pertaining to Yugoslav (Violence Prone Yugoslav Emigres in U. S. ) amounted to just 84 pages. I thought the FOIA request that I had submitted would be quick and free, given my entitlement to the first 100 pages of duplication being without charge.
Much to my surprise and delight, the response to my request was substantially more than expected. I actually received 178 pages of records in total. Plus, with the exception of agent names, informant names, and the names of their unwitting targets, there is little redaction allowing for a detailed and accurate reconstruction of the COINTELPRO operations directed at the Serbian emigre community in the United States.
Analysis below comes from a portion of my yet to be completed thesis:
Another reason for the lackluster response by the American government to Ustasha activities was that Ustasha activities in the United States were limited and eclipsed by the more active (in America ) Serbian émigré groups.
The Serbian émigrés were active in the United States before the Ustasha movement’s splinter factions began to take center stage. In February 1966, eight Yugoslav embassies and consulates throughout the United States and Canada were bombed. The FBI affixed responsibility for the bombings on Serbian émigrés, through it never arrested anyone in connection with the attacks. However, by the beginning of 1969, the FBI, having grown weary with the Serbian émigré communities actions, had position itself to strike back those “who have frequently capitalized on the bombings to build their reputations with the Serbians”.
A COINTELPRO campaign directed against VIOLENCE PRONE-Yugoslav émigrés were launched. The purpose of this COINTELPRO operation was “to create a feeling of mistrust” toward violent émigrés. From the currently declassified files, it appears that the first operation directed at violent Serb émigrés occurred in early 1968. The initial operation was to clandestinely distribute a flyer from a faux Serbian émigré group condemn violence against Yugoslav. However, it appears from the released records that the operation in question was long in development raising questions about possible earlier COINTELPRO operations despite FBI claims that all remaining files on COINTELPRO operations directed at violence prone Yugoslav émigrés have been released.
In October 1969, the FBI launched a plan to flush out Serbian terrorists by conducting faux investigations designed to capitalize on Yugoslav émigrés fears, spawned by a series of violent assassinations believed by most to have been done by the Yugoslav government, and convince them that Yugoslav intelligence services had infiltrated their ranks and were plotting similar acts here in the United States. Fears that this operation might lead to the widespread rupturing of the Serbian community led to modifications of the program. There were also concerns that Serbian émigrés might respond with violence, fearing the Yugoslav government. However, approval was given for the operation with the Chicago field office being given orders to formulate a plan to achieve their campaign’s objective.
Croatian terrorist are not mentioned until February 1970 as a possible target of COINTELPRO attention and investigation. In a memorandum to the FBI office, the Chicago field office reports that it had “recently been involved in determining the extent of” Otpor which the Chicago field office believed was “inclined toward militant direct action.” Chicago field office recommends expanding the planned operation to include Croatian émigrés and organizations. The FBI director agreed.
Ultimately, the Croatians were dismissed as a threat to the American national security. The FBI San Francisco found no evidence that they either promoted or were planning any violent actions against the Yugoslav government. The office reported that Croatians passively demonstrated in front Yugoslav consulate and that had been “incidents” where individuals had protested against the presence of Yugoslav officials at Croatian social gatherings. San Francisco Field Office also reported that the Ustasha movement was weak and resorted to tactics such as founding numerous organizations to all of its members would then join, creating the illusion of political clout. Ultimately, the operation was aborted due to “paranoiac fear” among Yugoslav émigrés of assassination by Yugoslav intelligence which was bolstered by the FBI’s early interviews.
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