Given the long-standing unpopularity of terrorists, it is highly unusual to find politicians that lobby on their behalf or actively promoting their importation into their nation. This make the following documents a rare find.
In 1994, at a point during the Homeland War when 1/3 of Croatia was occupied by Belgrade-backed rebel Serb forces, a time when the Croatian economy was under severe stress, at the tailend of the failed, ill-conceived Muslim-Croat War, Croatian Vice President Vladimir Seks found time in his schedule to lobby the United States Parole Commission on behalf Vinko Logarusic, informing Logarusic's case analyst that "the Republic of Croatia has no objections to Mr. Vinko Logarusic traveling to and from Croatia, on a single or continuing basis or any objections to his eventual permanent residency in the republic of Croatia.” As you can see from the second document in the PDF, this letter was a product of an effort by Logarusic to receive permission to travel to Croatia after his release.
Logarusic, as this 6/22/1994 letter from Logarusic's Case analyst to Senator Metzenbaum shows, was a vicious individual who "participated in a Croatian terrorist ring from 1975-1981 and were responsible for two murders, several attempted murders, approximately 15 bombings and attempted bombings, an international extortion scheme involving 50 United States victims and the transportation of weapons and explosive throughout the country. According to a "U.S. Attorneys report,” “the crimes committed by this terrorist were among some of the most violent ever committed in the United States over a sustained period of time".
Yet, Seks was willing to allow Logarusic to visit and live in Croatia.
Below are the rest of the records released by the United States Parole Commission in response to an appeal I had lodged.
Ivan Saric's INSCOM file (or part of it). For some reason it is not included on the finding aids of the RG 319 IWG records. I acquired through a redirected FOIA request to INSCOM. I suspect because, according to this release, it only contained a brief half-paged blurb worth of biography. The page also a short biography of Gregorij Rožman, bishop of Ljubljana and collaborator with the Nazis, who, like Saric, escaped justice after the war.
Again, I was late with the Document of the Week. This week's Document of the Week is a 12/08/05 cable from the US embassy in Zagreb to Foggy Bottom providing the details of how Ante Gotovina was captured. Citing sources within Croatian intelligence and (probably) the ICTY, (1) the US Embassy writes that Spanish intelligence, the Croatian Intelligence Agency (IA) and the Croatian Counter Intelligence Agency (POA), and select ICTY officials tracked him for months.The cable also noted that Gotovina's arrest "marked a major step forward for Croatian law enforcement, as no word of this effort had leaked to the public during the multi-month operation."
(1) Given the cable redacts the name of the informant, there is no way to know for sure at this time. Given the cable is not sent to the American embassy in Madrid, this leads to me to believe that the cable's named source is not from the Spanish government. Nothing more than a hunch leads me to conclude that the source if from the ICTY instead of Croatian.
(2) This cable was photocopied in an effort to cover up some food stains. It failed. Even worse the photocopy of the cable was shrunk. To make it more readable and to reduce its size, I axed a lot of white space.
In response to a FOIA request I had submitted for the records of Croatian dissident nationalist and the manifesto writer for the hijackers of TWA-355 Bruno Busic, the CIA released fifteen pages of records (and invoked Glomar regarding the existence or non-existence of any other records), just finished intelligence reports, on him. The first document is a single page from the 21 September 1972 Eastern Europe Intelligencer in which the CIA reported that Busic, Franjo Tudjman, and another man were on trial, accused of working with “unspecified foreign intelligence service,” which in the case of Busic meant the CIA. The CIA also made note of Busic's contacts with emigre Croatian radicals.
The next document is the entire 14 December 1971 Central Intelligence Bulletin in which Busic was discussed. Sandwiched between a redacted in its entirety article and an article on the controversy very over the Soviet intention to open an embassy in Costa Rica is a page long article on the crackdown on Croatian nationalists by the Yugoslav government. At least thirty people, including Bruno Busic, were arrested and the Yugoslav government denounced their actions and threatened further interventions to maintain order.
N.B.- I know that I have promised several of my readers that I was going to cut down on Scribd uploads. I intend to do so. However, I had already scanned this document and Google Documents refuses to accept it. Thus I have no choice.
As for the record itself, it is a July 1982 CIA study on “terrorist skyjacking”. The use of “Skyjacking” to describe airline hijackings makes this report worthwhile by itself because SKYJACKING is a boss word and deserves to be resurrected from its linguistic purgatory.
More seriously, this 24-page CIA report is a statistical study with historical commentary on the rise and prevalence of terrorist skyjackings and presumably garden-variety skyjackings since the first “terrorist skyjacking” took place in 1968 when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) seized an El-Al jet liner.(1) The CIA's statistics reveal a great deal of common wisdom challenging information:
As documented by the CIA, 9% of all terrorist attacks were skyjackings. The 684 skyjackings between 1968 and 1982 resulted in at least 500 deaths and 400 injuries. Of the 684 skyjackings, the CIA ruled 108 of them “terrorist skyjackings” and that these terrorist skyjackings. Among these 108, forty turned violent with the end result being 212 dead and 186 wounded.
So, contrary to popular wisdom, the pre-911 skyjackings were not necessarily safe nor simply affairs to draw media attention to one's cause or to procure the release of one's comrades.
While terrorist skyjackings were done by many groups for both attention and to secure the release of their members, the bulk of the hijackings were done by Palestinians.
Between 1968- July 1982:
Cuba was the most common diversion point. Cuba also granted safe haven to terrorist skyjackers the most often.
Lebanon was the most frequent point of origin for hijacked aircraft as well as the skyjackers' most frequently boarding point
While only 7% of skyjackings occurred in the North America, American aircraft were the most often skyjacked.
So again, the post-911 narrative that Americans had little experience with foreign terrorism is explicitly challenged and even debunked.
Sprinkled throughout the paper are some nifty graphics, one of which reveals a steep and briefly sustain drop-off in terrorist skyjackings in response to new security measures such as metal detectors.
On a final note, some caution is required when reading this report. The CIA itself admits to using “incomplete data” and I know that the CIA is incorrect in describing two incidents listed in this report.
First, only five Croatians were released during the 1972 hijacking in Sweden and secondly, only four Croatians and the American wife of the ringleader hijacked TWA-355 in September 1976.
The following NIEs on the Bosnian War and Homeland War were recently declassified and given to me by the CIA in response to a FOIA request that I had submitted.
NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]
Issued in May 1993, this nine- page, classified “Secret” document gives insight into the CIA's pessimistic view for Bosnia's prospects and of the Bosnian government. The document reveals that the
The CIA believed that maintaining Bosnia's integrity after the implementation of a Vance-Owen Plan would require a commitment of time and resources on par with that made to South Korea after the Korean War.
The CIA believed that the “Muslims” were capable of “creat[ing] violent incidents that could be blamed on the Serbs and Croats.”
And the language of the NIE also shows that the CIA held the Bosnian government as being little better than the VRS and HVO it fought. In addition to the above “Muslims” and “Serbs and Croats,” another part of the NIE referes to the “Bosnian Serb Army” and the “Muslim-dominated Bosnian Army.”
Update Memorandum on NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]
This five- page memorandum, classified “Secret” is an update to the May 1993 NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]. The highlights of this document include
The CIA's belief that a Bosnia divided as intended by the Vance-Owen Plan would not survive long.
The CIA's opinion that the Europeans would not remained engage long in Bosnia if the United States refused to get involved.
This eleven-page, classified “Secret” document is a July 1993 National Intelligence Estimate on the probability of renewed warfare in Croatia during the lull in the Homeland War, the reaction of Serbia to such fighting, and the impact such violence would have on Bosnia, Croatia, and the world.
The CIA believed there was “less than even chance” of a peaceful settlement of the Homeland War and that the Croatians would hold if ti sensed progress in negotiations with the RSK.
The Croatian diaspora, particularly the “Herzegovinian Mafia”, were driving the HDZ and Franjo Tudjman's nationalist agenda,
The West's influence had and was continuing to keep the Croatians from restarting the Homeland War beyond the minor skirmishes.
Finally, it appears that the CIA was aware of Croatian military actions that appear to be mobilization and preparation for the Medak Pocket Operation.
NIE 93-23/I Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia
This thirteen-page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the first part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. Among the more interesting points contained with this document are:
The horrible CIA-produced map on page 4 of the Estimate
The CIA's referral to the Bosnian government as “factional leaders” on par with the HVO and VRS.
The CIA's belief that the Bosnian government would attacks Western targets and frame the Serbs.
The CIA's ultimately mistaken belief that the HVO, with Croatian military assistance, could hold on to captured territory indefinitely.
The attention given to the possible threat to Serbia's neighbors by that nation's military force. The CIA estimated that Macedonia, Hungry, and Bulgaria would all need outside assistance to beat Serbia while the much larger Romanian military
NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia\II
This sixty-eight page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the concluding part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. It has more detailed analysis of the points brought up in volume I of NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia.
The most interesting aspect of this document is the attention given to the prospect for terrorism by or on behalf of the Bosnian government Or the “Bosnian Muslims” as the CIA would term it while ignoring prior acts of Serbian terrorism such as the bombings and hijackings by individuals such as Nikola Kavaja and the limited description of Croatian terrorism such as the 1980 bombing of the Statue of Liberty and the 9/10 Hijacking of TWA-355 both acts which were intended to bring about an independent Croatian state.
In January 1951, C.E. Hennrich, of the FBI, sent a memorandum to A.H. Belmont, of the FBI in which he argued that the FBI should “undertake no active investigation of Yugoslav immigrants and displaced persons who have been members of or associated with the Fascist Ustashi elements in World War II unless their activities after arriving in the United States appear to be inimical to the internal security.” Hennrich instead proposed that all “such allegations” be referred to INS for such action as is deemed advisable with the comment that the Bureau contemplates no investigation unless subsequent information indicates the subject's activities after arriving in the United Sates appear to be inimical to the internal security.” Hennrich stated that because of “the hatred between the Serbs and Croats,” which was “well-known,” and based on “political and religious difference which antecede World War II by many years.” and “the historical desire of the Croats for a separate state,” not all Ustashi were fascists. Hennrich also believed it was “expedient” for Croatians to support the German occupation and the Ustashi due to the former's occupation and the other's alliance with the Nazis.1 No formal response to this memorandum can be found in the FBI records at the National Archives or amongst the records I have had declassified. However, the cases of Janko Tortic and Andrija
Artukovic reveals a pattern of FBI behavior that indicates that this proposal was implemented. I will blog about this case in a forthcoming post.
Branko Peshelj was a member of the Croatian Peasant Party and advisor to its long time leader Vladko Macek. He was also an American government employee and informant to the FBI. Combined this makes him one of the more important Croatian emigres during the post-Second World War period.
However, only a portion of his FBI files were released as part of Interagency Working Group efforts. Back when I was doing archival research, I pressed the NARA staff to release for more of his records. This summer, I achieved the success seen below. I was also informed another of Peshelj's FBI files was being dispatched to NARA. While this will force me to miss work to hop over there and acquire it, it just seems tacky, after all my bitching, not to grab it.
Earlier this year, Bosnian and Balkans politics heaved a bit when Stjepan Mesic publicly threatened the Republika Srpska with destruction if they took steps to destroy the current Bosnian state. Bosnian Serbs gasped in horror. The West frettered. Bosnians took heart. The best reaction of was of my Croatian friend who declared that Mesic, a civilized leftist, "simply was taking whatever measures were needed to keep Bosnia together and the unwashed, right-wing, Ustasha fucks that make up the Bosnian "Croat" (*) population out of our country." (1)
What wasn't reported was that Mesic had been making these threats privately for at least year according to the U.S. State Department. Apparently, whenever Milorad Dodik escalated his rhetoric and threats to break away from Bosnia, Mesic would reply with threats of breaking the RS. Nice. See the State Department cable on the matter:
(1) He did air quotes. Had he been drunk, he probably would have gone off on our mutual Bosnian Croat friend about how he was Bosnian and needed to accept that fact.
My favorite show is Burn Notice. The premise of the show is that the lead character, a former CIA spy named Michael Westen, was "burnt" (a burnt spy is one who is fired and transformed into a pariah) as part of an effort to recruit him into a still unknown or unknown covert conspiracy against enemies and enemies unknown. As of about midway through season four, Westen has made some progress in discovering in why he was burnt, who burnt him, and why he was burnt.
The title of the show Burn Notice comes from the document issued when a spy of individual is burnt by the intelligence community. A Burn Notice is issued when a person proves untrustworthy, dangerous to the American intelligence community after previously worthy, or just becomes a dangerous nuisance. Below is a US Army CIC “burn notice” for Krunoslav Draganovic, a Croatian priest, member of the Ustasha movement, and US Army CIC asset directed against Yugoslavia during the early portion of the Cold War. Draganovic will initially come to US Army CIC attention during the early days of the Cold War. He was evacuating members of the Ustasha movement from Europe to destinations such as Argentina. Later, Draganovic was employed by the US Army to evacuate Klaus Barbie from Europe. Eventually, Draganovic became a target of US intelligence and an asset for the US Army CIC. (*)
That was true until 1962 as shown by this Burn Notice, Krunoslav Draganovic was burnt by the US Army CIC for reasons of security, demands of support for his fellow Croatian terrorists, and simply not being controllable. While his activities were still monitored by American intelligence, he ceased to be a source.
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