Arkan Declassified: What the CIA Was Willing to Disclosed

Željko Ražnatović aka Arkan was the most mediagenic, infamous, and well-known Serbian warlord. Married to glamorous turbo-folk singer Ceca, owner of a leading Serbian soccer team, and possessor of the best-trained thugs in all the Balkans, he had little competition in that regard.

In response to a recent FOIA request seeking "all previously released records" pertaining to Željko Ražnatović, the CIA released just two records. The first is a FBIS translation of a Slovenian media article titled, "Rape as a Means of Battle" in which the authors report on the allegations the rape warfare strategies employed by VRS forces in Bosnia were organized, approved, and defended at the very top. The second - and far more interesting document- is a copy of the portions of the CIA's April 1999 Terrorism Review dealing with possible anti-American violence spawned by the NATO intervention against Serb genocide in Kosovo.

While I honestly disbelieve that Arkan named his group the Serbian Terrorist Organization Resistance Movement (STOP). I do not disbelieve that Arkan had the capacity- probably an organized, named capacity-to strike at the United States. However, I doubt he would have used it to defend Serbia. I base it not only on his failure to use it, but also the fact that Arkan was about Arkan first. While Hungary, Macedonia, Croatia, and the rest of the Balkans might be willing to tolerate his criminal enterprises, none of them could or would tolerate terrorist attacks on its soil, much less directed  terrorism at it. A single Arkan ordered terrorist attack would meant the end of his lucrative rackets. Thus, why, in part, there were none.

Anyway, enjoy the files.

Arkan's (Available) CIA File

The Milosevic Files

A rapid method to procure documents from the CIA is limit your request to "previously released records." This means sacrificing your right to appeal and usually (but not always) receiving stuff in the public domain. Y

I recently submitted several such requests for Yugoslav leaders such as Milovan Djilas, Aleksandar Ranković, Slobodan Milosevic, Željko Ražnatović (Arkan), and Edvard Kardelj. In the cases of Djilas, Ranković, and Kardelj, I received significant numbers of hard-to-find documents relating to the men. My request for Arkan's files, I was given two documents a FBIS translation of a Slovenian newspaper article and a copy of a Terrorism Review."

In response to Milosevic, I received two "requester reports"- a one- page report and another eight page report. I am not sure how they were created, but they list every previously released document on Milosevic. I done some research on the CIA's websites. The check marks means you'll find it searching for "Milosevic" while the an "x" means you have to search for that specific document. No marks means you'll most likely have to order it up.

Milosevic Requester Report

CIA Thoughts on the Homeland and Bosnian Wars

The following NIEs on the Bosnian War and Homeland War were recently declassified and given to me by the CIA in response to a FOIA request that I had submitted.

 

NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]

Issued in May 1993, this nine- page, classified “Secret” document gives insight into the CIA's pessimistic view for Bosnia's prospects and of the Bosnian government. The document reveals that the

The CIA believed that maintaining Bosnia's integrity after the implementation of a Vance-Owen Plan would require a commitment of time and resources on par with that made to South Korea after the Korean War.

The CIA believed that the “Muslims” were capable of “creat[ing] violent incidents that could be blamed on the Serbs and Croats.”

And the language of the NIE also shows that the CIA held the Bosnian government as being little better than the VRS and HVO it fought. In addition to the above “Muslims” and “Serbs and Croats,” another part of the NIE referes to the “Bosnian Serb Army” and the “Muslim-dominated Bosnian Army.”

NIE 93-22 Prospects for Bosnia

Update Memorandum on NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]

This five- page memorandum, classified “Secret” is an update to the May 1993 NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]. The highlights of this document include

The CIA's belief that a Bosnia divided as intended by the Vance-Owen Plan would not survive long.

The CIA's opinion that the Europeans would not remained engage long in Bosnia if the United States refused to get involved.

Update Memo NIE-93-22

NIE 93-26 Croatia:When Will Fighting Resume?

This eleven-page, classified “Secret” document is a July 1993 National Intelligence Estimate on the probability of renewed warfare in Croatia during the lull in the Homeland War, the reaction of Serbia to such fighting, and the impact such violence would have on Bosnia, Croatia, and the world.

The CIA believed there was “less than even chance” of a peaceful settlement of the Homeland War and that the Croatians would hold if ti sensed progress in negotiations with the RSK.

The Croatian diaspora, particularly the “Herzegovinian Mafia”, were driving the HDZ and Franjo Tudjman's nationalist agenda,

The West's influence had and was continuing to keep the Croatians from restarting the Homeland War beyond the minor skirmishes.

Finally, it appears that the CIA was aware of Croatian military actions that appear to be mobilization and preparation for the Medak Pocket Operation.

NIE 93-26 Croatia:When Will Fighting Resume?

NIE 93-23/I Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia

This thirteen-page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the first part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. Among the more interesting points contained with this document are:

The horrible CIA-produced map on page 4 of the Estimate

The CIA's referral to the Bosnian government as “factional leaders” on par with the HVO and VRS.

The CIA's belief that the Bosnian government would attacks Western targets and frame the Serbs.

The CIA's ultimately mistaken belief that the HVO, with Croatian military assistance, could hold on to captured territory indefinitely.

The attention given to the possible threat to Serbia's neighbors by that nation's military force. The CIA estimated that Macedonia, Hungry, and Bulgaria would all need outside assistance to beat Serbia while the much larger Romanian military

NIE 93-23/I Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia

NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia\II

This sixty-eight page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the concluding part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. It has more detailed analysis of the points brought up in volume I of NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia.

The most interesting aspect of this document is the attention given to the prospect for terrorism by or on behalf of the Bosnian government Or the “Bosnian Muslims” as the CIA would term it while ignoring prior acts of Serbian terrorism such as the bombings and hijackings by individuals such as Nikola Kavaja and the limited description of Croatian terrorism such as the 1980 bombing of the Statue of Liberty and the 9/10 Hijacking of TWA-355 both acts which were intended to bring about an independent Croatian state.

NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia Volume II

The Threat of Serbian Suicide Attacks

This August 1992 cable from the American Embassy in Belgrade reveals that the Bosnian Serbs openly threatened to conduct terrorist attacks against Western targets which included, but was not limited to nuclear power plants, using “kamikaze pilots” and “volunteers from friendly nations.” Who these volunteers were, assuming they existed is left unstated in the cable. I would presume they were, again assuming they were make-believe, members of the Serbian diaspora or Serbian underground in Europe, America, Australia, and elsewhere.

See the bottom of the second page of the PDF.

SerbianSuicide Attacks Cable

America has a Communist -style Education Funding System & Other More Serious Things About Yugoslav Students

This is a CIA study of Yugoslav university students and youth written in the summer of 1968 according to 5/7/1973 Memorandum to the DCI regarding the broader report this paper of which this document was a portion. This document was reported to exist when the CIA released its infamous "Crown Jewels" collection I have a limited amount of time, so I am only going to hit the report’s highlights:

A)The report notes the age range of the Partisan generation which at the time of the report range from the leadership like Tito being well into their seventies and eighties while at the tail end there were individuals still in their forties. (pg.4)

B)Interestingly, Yugoslav schools and American schools are funded via the same primary means- local taxes. Just like in America, areas of Yugoslavia with high levels of wealth had high quality schools, while economically disadvantaged areas had inferior educational opportunities (pg.9)

A personal note, I intend to criticize everyone I know who mindlessly favors local control of education as being a "Commie" and by citing this report.

C)Something else I found noteworthy- Yugoslavia reduced the student loan burdens of university students who rapidly completed their studies. Given the white hot mess that Yugoslav higher education come be, it’s not easy to say if that was a good idea or would be a good idea in the United States, but I think it might be worthwhile to examine it as a student loan reform here in the United States. (pg.9)

D)Finally, the students of Sarajevo rioted along with the students of Belgrade. (pg.10)

A CIA 1968 Study of Yugoslav Youth

Stjepan Mesic's Hardcore

Earlier this year, Bosnian and Balkans politics heaved a bit when Stjepan Mesic publicly threatened the Republika Srpska with destruction if they took steps to destroy the current Bosnian state. Bosnian Serbs gasped in horror. The West frettered. Bosnians took heart. The best reaction of was of my Croatian friend who declared that Mesic, a civilized leftist, "simply was taking whatever measures were needed to keep Bosnia together and the unwashed, right-wing, Ustasha fucks that make up the Bosnian "Croat" (*) population out of our country." (1)

What wasn't reported was that Mesic had been making these threats privately for at least year according to the U.S. State Department. Apparently, whenever Milorad Dodik escalated his rhetoric and threats to break away from Bosnia, Mesic would reply with threats of breaking the RS. Nice.  See the State Department cable on the matter:

1/20/2010 State Department Cable on Stjepan Mesic Threat to Destroy the Republika Srpska

(1) He did air quotes. Had he been drunk, he probably would have gone off on our mutual Bosnian Croat friend about how he was Bosnian and needed to accept that fact.