In response to a FOIA request for their records pertaining to the Bradley Manning Support Network, INSCOM sent the out a letter informing the requesters that their request had been forwarded to the United States Army Criminal Investigation Division for processing. When the requesters followed up, seeking information as to whether INSCOM was still processing the request, they met up with brief resistance before Elaine Rogic informed the requesters:
Per DOD instruction, all inquiries relating to this matter must be forwarded to the U.S. Army Crime Records Center (CRC). I am unable to answer your inquiry and recommend that you direct your inquiry to CRC.
Further inquiry by the requesters was ignored including a request for clarification as to whether or not INSCOM was invoking FOIA. Administrative appeals have been submitted.
In short, the Bradley Manning Support Network appears to be something special if INSCOM is unable to answer whether or not it has responsive records or even invoke Glomar by itself.
Below is the relevant email exchange provided to the Historiographic Anarchy by the requester.
In response to a FOIA request, the
United States Army Criminal Investigative Division announced that it
was engaged in “an active investigation … in progress with an
undetermined completion date,” of the Bradley Manning Support
Network. As a consequence of this investigation, the Army CID would
not release any material responsive to FOIA requests at this time.
The US Army CID has invoked (b)(7)(f)
to justify, in part, their denial. This means that US Army CID
believes that release of these records will risk the physical
well-being of individuals involved with the case.
With WikiLeaks records being withheld, in part, on (b)(7)(f) exemptions grounds, it seems
that Army CID has decided that both WikiLeaks supporters and members
of allied organizations are a threat to commit physical violence
either against investigators or those who cooperate with the
investigations.
Citing “an active investigation …
in progress with an undetermined completion date,” the United
States Army Criminal Investigation Division refuses further releases
of that agency's WikiLeaks-related material. In contrast to two
previous FOIA requests <here and here> which were promptly answered with released
documents featuring limited redaction, this policy shift represents a
wholesale end to WikiLeaks releases for the indeterminate future.
Possibly more interesting than the
denial of records itself is that US Army CID invoked (b)(7)(f) as a
justifying exemption. Under the (b)(7)(f) exemption, records can be
withheld if their release “could reasonably be expected to endanger
the life or physical safety of any individual.” With the use of the
(b)(7)(f) exemption, US Army CID is implicitly stating that WikiLeaks
members pose an active, physical threat to those investigating
WikiLeaks and/or those cooperating with the investigation.
For all the hubbub about WikiLeaks and alleged plots by the CIA and Department of Defense to frame or assassinate its leader Julian Assange, it seems that many federal law enforcement agencies are simply not putting in significant effort to stop WikiLeaks.
It can now be reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has thus far declined to investigate the Wau Holland Foundation. The Wau Holland Foundation, named after a famed member of the German computer hacking collective Chaos Computer Club, has been named as a leading source of WikiLeaks of funding (processor of donations see below) by the Wall Street Journal. Despite this and the linkage to the Chaos Computer Club, the FBI has opted not to investigate further.
Nota Bene
I was informed via Twitter that describing Wau Holland Foundation as a "funder" was incorrect. Looking at it again, I'm inclined to treat it as a funder. It is claimed that all it does is accept donations for WikiLeaks which it then (allegedly) dispenses. However, I have never dealt or seen any organization that supposedly just accepts funds on behalf of a non-profit for that non-profit's use turn around and demand receipts before issuing out grants.
Even if I am wrong on this point, my major point about American law enforcement and military agencies not caring about WikiLeaks remains unchallenged.
WikiLeaks is an “extremist website” according to a February 2009 Agent’s Activity Summary from [redacted], a Criminal Intelligence Specialist with US Army Criminal Investigation Division.
Other than choice tidbit and the revelation that WikiLeaks is not a member of the Better Business Bureau, there is little else of interest in [redacted] Criminal Intelligence Specialist’s Agent’s Activity Summary. This report tells that WikiLeaks was investigated again on 2/18/2009 when a captain with the Washington State Patrol called the 44th Military Police Detachment (CID), Fort Lewis, WA to warn them about a “website that may solicit soldiers to upload sensitive or classified documents to a public website.”
After the website was identified as Wikileaks.org, an investigation was launched. Rudimentary and limited in scope, the investigation into WikiLeaks revealed that “according to Google, Wikileaks publishes and comments on leaked documents alleging government and corporate misconduct.” [redacted] Criminal Intelligence Specialist proceeded to check the “About” section on the WikiLeaks home page, to find out that it was started by “Chinese dissidents, journalists, mathematicians, and startup company technologists, from the United States, Taiwan, Europe, Australia and South Africa.” [redacted] Criminal Intelligence Specialist also noted that WikiLeaks disavowed any “formal relationship with Wikipedia” and WikiLeaks ’ proclamation that it “was not a front for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) or the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) AKA MI6.” [redacted] Criminal Intelligence Specialist detailed that WikiLeaks encourage “whistleblowers” to submit documents and details the process by which those submissions occurred.
[redacted] Criminal Intelligence Specialist then lists some of the United States military records then available on WikiLeaks before concluding with a listing of the assorted inquires conducted during [redacted] Criminal Intelligence Specialist’s investigation. [redacted] Criminal Intelligence Specialist reported that a check of Whois.net shows that WikiLeaks is registered through GoDaddy.com, and the point of contact listed in the Whois.net is [redacted] causing [redacted] Criminal Intelligence Specialist to mock WikiLeaks’ “army of analysts, journalists and other staff”. Finally, Lexis Nexis and the Better Business Bureau “revealed no record.”
The report is concluded with Army CID record keeping matters. The report and the information contained within were “disseminated for criminal purposes,” while no “.0015 funds were expended.” Finally, the report is noted as being “terminal.” At the very end, the standard CID boilerplate about use of their reports is included along with a distribution list for the report itself.
My other post on the NCIS' WikiLeaks investigation is available here. For my report on the Defense Technical Information Center lack of Wikileaks.org records, see here Finally, here is an earlier posting about an investigation into WikiLeaks by the Army CID.
On December 3, 2007, the assistant security manager of the 655th Regional Support Group was alerted by a unit member who reported finding a very detailed listing of 382nd Military Police Battalion has discovered a “very detailed listing of 382nd MP BN equipment on Wikileaks.org. (The report is still available here). The assistant security manager alerted his chain of command as well as the 94 RRC (Regional Readiness Reserve Commands) Command Security Manager. The 94 RCC Security Manager alerted Mr. [Redacted] seeking guidance on which law enforcement and or military intelligence units had to be contacted. Permission was also requested for the incident to be included in the 94 RCC Security Manager’s OPSEC (Operational Security) briefing.
On December 7, 2007, The agent who created the “Agent’s Activity Summary” stated that he was going to contact the West Point CID (Criminal Investigation Division ) to determine whether the Active Duty CID had a plan in place for such contingencies.
While the Agent’s Activity Summary states, “I do know at this moment,” I believe what the Activity Summary agent meant to say was “I do not know at this moment…” based on his earlier statement about contacting West Point CID for direction on how to handle the incident. The agent listed a few possibilities: 902nd Military Intelligence (MI), the West Point CID Office, or possibly the JTTF or a MA fusion cell. He also expressed his “strong support” for inclusion in the OPSEC briefing. All this occurred between 8:30 when the Special- Agent- in- Charge [Redacted], Boston Fraud Resident Agency received an email from a Mr. {Redacted] Ani-terrorism officer that an listing of 382nd MP BN equipment had been posted on Wikileaks.
Shortly after noon on December 7th, West Point CID’s Special- Agent- in- Charge announced via email that it was decided the leak was an OPSEC issue and that the 902nd MI would have “investigative responsibility” and that if the 902nd MI needed assistance that the West Office would provide it. He also advised that West Point CID had no intention of beginning its own investigation into the matter.
At 5:15 December 7th, the Activity Summary agent received an “email string” from a MPRI (military professional Resources Inc. staffer attached with IMCOM- NE ATO, IMC, North East Region; Current Operations which reported that one of the assistant security managers at Ft. Devens “chanced upon” a British website which has placed the entire joint service TDA & TO&E for Iraq and Afghanistan theaters on their website. This appears to be a reference to the events of December 3, 2007 discussed in the first paragraph. The author of the email stated that he “feels certain” that “someone” in the DOD is aware of the situation that he is reporting but is reporting “this information” to Army CID so that Army CID could alert the DA (Department of Army) OPSEC POC (Point of Contact). A Ms. [redacted] is noted as having passed the information to the Joint OPSEC Support Center. Activity Summary Agent then reports his intention to close TAB but only after following up with 902nd MI. On December 17, 2007, the agent reports that Special Agent [redacted] told him that “he had attempted to follow-up by requesting the lists of equipment from the unit, which was pending. His initial position is that none of the equipment was sensitive and therefore not releasable. He [sic] agreed that it probably should not be [on?] a website, but it is an issue that his office will not further pursue.
The released records raise all sorts of questions. Did Bradley Manning have any involvement in this leak? I have not been able to turn up any information on his duty stations. I doubt it given Manning enlisted in 2007.
Why did the US Army allow for such a lackluster investigation? Granted the 902nd decided that the files that were leaked were not “not releasable,” that still didn’t prevent someone for being nailed for violating OPSEC. Or being discovered and monitored for future violations. As far as the Army goes this could possibly be a missed opportunity prevent the future Manning leaks to Wikileaks.
Finally, why did the Army CID send me these records? Seriously, I did not request these records. I sought out the investigative records for a different Wikileaks leak investigation. Was this done in error?
In contrast, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) gave little consideration or attention to WikiLeaks. In response to a FOIA request for all NCIS records pertaining to WikiLeaks, NCIS released, with some minor redactions by NCIS and the Army Criminal Investigative Division for reasons of privacy, two pages of records. Assuming a honest disclosure, and the disclosed documents provided no reason to doubt that it is, the records demonstrate a surprising passivity of one of the DOD's premier investigative arms toward WikiLeaks given the all but declared war against WikiLeaks by the Pentagon.
The first page of the PDF is the cover page of the investigative file. It is the standard NCIS cover sheet designed to facilitate the rapid identification of the file. The investigation file is named “ WikiLeaks/Suspected Leakage of Classified Information” and was assigned case number 08FEB0824D400075EC. This investigation was a follow-up into a report of leaked classified information on WikiLeaks . The second page of the PDF, a single page report dated 2/8/2008 from that investigation, shows that a member of the NETWARCOM Security informed NCIS that WikiLeaks was hosting classified material. A report was taken by a Reporting Agent (RA) who then contacted a Special Agent involved with FCI (Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations.) The FCI agent informed him the US Army Criminal Investigation Division had been contacted and was conducting their own investigation into the matter. It was decided that “No Further Reporting [was] Anticipated.” The case was closed the same day with no additional investigations having been conducted since.
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