Information regarding Navy policy toward sailors who have participated “in converstion [sic], therapy, reorientation therapy, reparative theory, or other programs designed to 'cure' homosexuality.”
the United States Navy, like the United States Air Force, has confirmed that it does not recognize the primary methodologies evangelicals and others in the homophobe community promote to handle the gay community.
It seems that if Ted Haggard had been a US sailor, his claims that he had prayed away the gay would fall on death ears.
A recently responded to FOIA request netted this call for/primer on "People's History," from the NSA in which a historian with the Center for Cryptologic History calls on NSA staffers to document their work and thoughts on major events, so that "History From Below" can be written.
Again, I was late with the Document of the Week. This week's Document of the Week is a 12/08/05 cable from the US embassy in Zagreb to Foggy Bottom providing the details of how Ante Gotovina was captured. Citing sources within Croatian intelligence and (probably) the ICTY, (1) the US Embassy writes that Spanish intelligence, the Croatian Intelligence Agency (IA) and the Croatian Counter Intelligence Agency (POA), and select ICTY officials tracked him for months.The cable also noted that Gotovina's arrest "marked a major step forward for Croatian law enforcement, as no word of this effort had leaked to the public during the multi-month operation."
(1) Given the cable redacts the name of the informant, there is no way to know for sure at this time. Given the cable is not sent to the American embassy in Madrid, this leads to me to believe that the cable's named source is not from the Spanish government. Nothing more than a hunch leads me to conclude that the source if from the ICTY instead of Croatian.
(2) This cable was photocopied in an effort to cover up some food stains. It failed. Even worse the photocopy of the cable was shrunk. To make it more readable and to reduce its size, I axed a lot of white space.
Despite the concern over the political impact of his absence shown in this cable, I doubt the absence of Ante Markovic, the last prime minister of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, due to surgery for an unknown throat concern had much impact on the course of Yugoslav history.
However, one should consider this cable in the broader FOIA context. This document discusses the personal medical history of a still living individual and was released intact with no redactions. In contrast, the FBI will not even considering releasing the FBI files of living individuals who have been tried and convicted within the federal court system. Nor will they release the FBI files of prominent
American leaders such as Joe Biden or Barack Obama despite the fact an argument can be made that their prominence and positions of authority overrule their b(6) privacy rights under FOIA.
Finally, does anyone know what Markovic's condition was? I cannot find any information on it in the secondary literature, any other declassified and released State Department cable, or memoir of a participant.
In the mid 1970s, Renatta Predmore filed a lawsuit against the NSA after she discovered she was denied a promotion due to her gender. She prevailed. The 1976 settlement of her case forced the NSA to include a woman on every promotion board. In 1980, a codicil amending this settlement compelled the NSA to to publish the male/female composition of their promotion boards each year. (1) Below are copies of those documents
A NSA history concedes that lawsuit did not totally end discrimination, but giving "a fair hearing for women at promotion time." (2) However as James Bamford documented in Body of Secret, the NSA still had serious deficiencies in this regard. (3)
In the hubbub spawned by the successful whacking of Osama Bin Laden, I totally forgot to post a Document of the Week. By the time I remembered to do so, it was already Thursday and I simply decided to shelve it until next week.
This Document of the Week is a June 1982 CIA report on terrorist attacks against American businesses aboard between January 1968 through December 1981. Twenty pages in length, the report includes several interesting graphs and numerous factoids that challenge the post-9/11 narrative that terrorism was unknown to the United States and its American inhabitants.
In the 14-year span covered by the report, the CIA noted there almost a thousand terrorist attacks against American business interests by foreign terrorists. Of the 953 attacks carried out by 98 different foreign terrorist organizations against American businesses, 144 of them caused casualties. The number of attacks increased from 1968 until they peaked in 1974 when they began a decline that was interrupted by an uptick in 1978 due to the events in Iran. During this time period, Argentina was the site of the most attacks against American businesses keeping with Latin America being the geographic location of the most attacks Argentinian terrorist organization Montoneros was the group responsible for the most terrorist attacks against American interests in the time period covered by the report. The Western Europe and the Middle East were each the locations of 18% of the total attacks followed by the North America (which includes the United States saw 16% of the total attacks.
This report does have some noticeable errors. A while back, I posted a similar CIA focused on skyjackings of American aircraft, which listed attacks by Croatian and Serbian nationalists groups opposed to the former Yugoslavia. This report lists and mentions those acts (calling them skyjackings) but fails to list the groups responsible for them.
In response to a FOIA request I had submitted for the records of Croatian dissident nationalist and the manifesto writer for the hijackers of TWA-355 Bruno Busic, the CIA released fifteen pages of records (and invoked Glomar regarding the existence or non-existence of any other records), just finished intelligence reports, on him. The first document is a single page from the 21 September 1972 Eastern Europe Intelligencer in which the CIA reported that Busic, Franjo Tudjman, and another man were on trial, accused of working with “unspecified foreign intelligence service,” which in the case of Busic meant the CIA. The CIA also made note of Busic's contacts with emigre Croatian radicals.
The next document is the entire 14 December 1971 Central Intelligence Bulletin in which Busic was discussed. Sandwiched between a redacted in its entirety article and an article on the controversy very over the Soviet intention to open an embassy in Costa Rica is a page long article on the crackdown on Croatian nationalists by the Yugoslav government. At least thirty people, including Bruno Busic, were arrested and the Yugoslav government denounced their actions and threatened further interventions to maintain order.
N.B.- I know that I have promised several of my readers that I was going to cut down on Scribd uploads. I intend to do so. However, I had already scanned this document and Google Documents refuses to accept it. Thus I have no choice.
As for the record itself, it is a July 1982 CIA study on “terrorist skyjacking”. The use of “Skyjacking” to describe airline hijackings makes this report worthwhile by itself because SKYJACKING is a boss word and deserves to be resurrected from its linguistic purgatory.
More seriously, this 24-page CIA report is a statistical study with historical commentary on the rise and prevalence of terrorist skyjackings and presumably garden-variety skyjackings since the first “terrorist skyjacking” took place in 1968 when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) seized an El-Al jet liner.(1) The CIA's statistics reveal a great deal of common wisdom challenging information:
As documented by the CIA, 9% of all terrorist attacks were skyjackings. The 684 skyjackings between 1968 and 1982 resulted in at least 500 deaths and 400 injuries. Of the 684 skyjackings, the CIA ruled 108 of them “terrorist skyjackings” and that these terrorist skyjackings. Among these 108, forty turned violent with the end result being 212 dead and 186 wounded.
So, contrary to popular wisdom, the pre-911 skyjackings were not necessarily safe nor simply affairs to draw media attention to one's cause or to procure the release of one's comrades.
While terrorist skyjackings were done by many groups for both attention and to secure the release of their members, the bulk of the hijackings were done by Palestinians.
Between 1968- July 1982:
Cuba was the most common diversion point. Cuba also granted safe haven to terrorist skyjackers the most often.
Lebanon was the most frequent point of origin for hijacked aircraft as well as the skyjackers' most frequently boarding point
While only 7% of skyjackings occurred in the North America, American aircraft were the most often skyjacked.
So again, the post-911 narrative that Americans had little experience with foreign terrorism is explicitly challenged and even debunked.
Sprinkled throughout the paper are some nifty graphics, one of which reveals a steep and briefly sustain drop-off in terrorist skyjackings in response to new security measures such as metal detectors.
On a final note, some caution is required when reading this report. The CIA itself admits to using “incomplete data” and I know that the CIA is incorrect in describing two incidents listed in this report.
First, only five Croatians were released during the 1972 hijacking in Sweden and secondly, only four Croatians and the American wife of the ringleader hijacked TWA-355 in September 1976.
For some reason, INSCOM sent me the portion of the Encyclopedia of Jihad dealing with codes, ciphers, and encryption. I am not one to let documents go to waste, so I have posted it for reader enjoyment.
This is the NSA's ARC registration entry for “Recorded Future.” The National Security Agency released this a while ago but public interest in the company waned, so I never got around to posting it. Until now.
Elizabeth Edwards, John Edwards' wife, does not have her own FBI file. However, I suspect she's present in her husband's undoubtedly substantial file. We'll find out after his death.
Edvard Kardelj was a former vice-president of Yugoslavia, a senior Partisan commander, and one of the leading post-second-world-war Communist intellectuals. Despite this, on December 16, 2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigation destroyed all but fifteen pages of their records pertaining to him. According to the Bureau, the only records that survived are fifteen pages pertaining to the 9/29/1977- 10/5/1977 visit by Kardelj to the United States.
The records are worthless for scholarship due to the extensive redactions made to them on the b(1), that is the information according to the FOIA statute, is “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy”. Judging from the markings on the surviving documents, the information that is being redacted is classified “Secret” meaning its release would cause “serious damage” to American national security. In the FBI's opinion, I cannot be not allowed to see the FBI's information on Kardelj because it would compromise American national security, yet, somehow the same information can confined to the wastebasket without the least harm to American national security.
The CIA's Office of Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis's 9/18/1999 Intelligence Report titled “Rwanda Struggling to Overcome Genocidal Past” is a well-written, and generally all-round stellar short-history of the Rwandan Genocide. Highlights of this document include
The author's clear, unequivocal rejection of the belief that the genocide "was a release of centuries-old ethnic hatreds.
The author's unhesitating assignment of responsibility to the guilty party.
The blunt, factual, and evidence-supported description of the genocide and the reasons behind the genocide.
In short, the author shows, the Rwandan Genocide was not the product of uncontrolled blood lust and ethnic hatreds, but was the cruel, cold, and well-thought plot of Hutu extremists fearing their lose of power and privilege.
The following NIEs on the Bosnian War and Homeland War were recently declassified and given to me by the CIA in response to a FOIA request that I had submitted.
NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]
Issued in May 1993, this nine- page, classified “Secret” document gives insight into the CIA's pessimistic view for Bosnia's prospects and of the Bosnian government. The document reveals that the
The CIA believed that maintaining Bosnia's integrity after the implementation of a Vance-Owen Plan would require a commitment of time and resources on par with that made to South Korea after the Korean War.
The CIA believed that the “Muslims” were capable of “creat[ing] violent incidents that could be blamed on the Serbs and Croats.”
And the language of the NIE also shows that the CIA held the Bosnian government as being little better than the VRS and HVO it fought. In addition to the above “Muslims” and “Serbs and Croats,” another part of the NIE referes to the “Bosnian Serb Army” and the “Muslim-dominated Bosnian Army.”
Update Memorandum on NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]
This five- page memorandum, classified “Secret” is an update to the May 1993 NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]. The highlights of this document include
The CIA's belief that a Bosnia divided as intended by the Vance-Owen Plan would not survive long.
The CIA's opinion that the Europeans would not remained engage long in Bosnia if the United States refused to get involved.
This eleven-page, classified “Secret” document is a July 1993 National Intelligence Estimate on the probability of renewed warfare in Croatia during the lull in the Homeland War, the reaction of Serbia to such fighting, and the impact such violence would have on Bosnia, Croatia, and the world.
The CIA believed there was “less than even chance” of a peaceful settlement of the Homeland War and that the Croatians would hold if ti sensed progress in negotiations with the RSK.
The Croatian diaspora, particularly the “Herzegovinian Mafia”, were driving the HDZ and Franjo Tudjman's nationalist agenda,
The West's influence had and was continuing to keep the Croatians from restarting the Homeland War beyond the minor skirmishes.
Finally, it appears that the CIA was aware of Croatian military actions that appear to be mobilization and preparation for the Medak Pocket Operation.
NIE 93-23/I Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia
This thirteen-page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the first part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. Among the more interesting points contained with this document are:
The horrible CIA-produced map on page 4 of the Estimate
The CIA's referral to the Bosnian government as “factional leaders” on par with the HVO and VRS.
The CIA's belief that the Bosnian government would attacks Western targets and frame the Serbs.
The CIA's ultimately mistaken belief that the HVO, with Croatian military assistance, could hold on to captured territory indefinitely.
The attention given to the possible threat to Serbia's neighbors by that nation's military force. The CIA estimated that Macedonia, Hungry, and Bulgaria would all need outside assistance to beat Serbia while the much larger Romanian military
NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia\II
This sixty-eight page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the concluding part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. It has more detailed analysis of the points brought up in volume I of NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia.
The most interesting aspect of this document is the attention given to the prospect for terrorism by or on behalf of the Bosnian government Or the “Bosnian Muslims” as the CIA would term it while ignoring prior acts of Serbian terrorism such as the bombings and hijackings by individuals such as Nikola Kavaja and the limited description of Croatian terrorism such as the 1980 bombing of the Statue of Liberty and the 9/10 Hijacking of TWA-355 both acts which were intended to bring about an independent Croatian state.
If you're curious as to why the African Union and other Sub-Saharan African governments have provided so much support for Qaddafi and his efforts to maintain power check out this 9/9/1998 Intelligence Report from the CIA's Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis titled Sub-Saharan Africa: Seeking Pragmatic Relations with Rogue States.
In Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalization Debate, Naomi Klein recounts her less than thrilled" reaction to the revelation that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was reading her book, No Logo, for information on the Alter-globalization movement. Curious, I had a FOIA request submitted for information regarding No Logo to the FBI.
While Matthew Hastings' article on the shenanigans and poor attitude of General Stanley McCrystal and his staff provoked a great deal of heated debate. Leading scions of media criticized Hasting for how he obtained his information, for the fact that he reported on the matter at all. Even Hastings' patriotism was questioned. Obama's decision to remove McCrystal provided controversy as well.
In contrast, mainstream Pakistani media enthusiastically approved of Obama's dismissal of McChrystal. A June 25, 2010 cable from the American Embassy in Islamabad to the Secretary of State on the big stories in the Pakistani media documented the reaction of mainstream Pakistani media. Below are the choice selections of the reactions captured by the US Embassy in Islamabad:
Editorial: Institutions Above Individuals, an editorial in the populist, often sensational national English daily "The News" (cir. 55,000)(06 /25)
The dismissal of a top-ranking general by the U.S. President may be an unusual event, but, as President Obama has said, the tough decision, taken at a vital point in the nine-year war in Afghanistan, drives home the importance of institutions and the fact that they are more important than individuals.... The U.S. military, despite its strength and size, has through time developed sufficient maturity to keep itself aloof from affairs of government and to accept decisions made by Presidents. This has a long background of institution-building, with the dismissal of General Douglas McArthur in the 1950s too resulting in no disruption in U.S. affairs; there was no coup d'etat, no warning statements from the men in uniform.
The tradition of civilian authority held firm.... The wider impact of the change in command in Afghanistan is yet not known. Pakistan will be watching events to its west attentively, given that developments in Afghanistan have a direct impact on the war against militancy at home. Only time will tell if there is to be any change and the nature of this if one does indeed occur.
Editorial: The FaIl Of A General, an editorial. in the center-right national English daily "The Nation" (cir. 20,000) (06 / 25)
"If the top commander in a theatre of war entertains disparaging views of the civilian bosses, there would be a disconnect between the two in this vital matter. McChrystal's exit, no doubt establishes civilian control over the military - a fundamental principle of democratic set-ups - but, as the General has supporters both in the armed forces and civilian institutions, like for instance, Congress, it is not going to be smooth sailing for the President. However, with President Obama asserting, "it is a change in personnel-, but it is not a change in policy", one should not expect a much more different outcome of the war when General David Petraeus takes over.... Did the realization that the war efforts have come up against a dead-end cause McChrystal frustration and also lead him to adopt this questionable attitude?"
Opinion: McChrystal's Sacking And Afghan Endgame, an op-ed by Shafqat Mahmood in the populist, often sensational national English daily "The News" (cir. 55,000) (06/25)
"More than the notion of establishing civilian supremacy, it was important for the first black president in U.S. history to assert his authority over the military.... People like McChrystal argued that to make the Taliban amenable to negotiations, they have to be put under pressure. This view prevailed despite opposition. Hence, the troop surge and the operation in Helmand and another in the works for Kandahar. The first operation has been unsuccessful and the second will fare no better. The Taliban will perhaps negotiate but on their own terms. The demand on Pakistan is strange. On the one hand, we are being asked to launch a military operation against the Taliban in North Waziristan and apprehend them in other places if they are here. And, on the other, there is a desire for us to facilitate dialogue with them. Thus, they are asking us to attack those who they want us to help become friends with. These and other contradictions will play themselves out in the next two years. Since
it is in the vital interest of Pakistan to have a friendly Afghanistan, we will have to broaden our links to all the Afghan people. The Americans will leave but we have to live here. It is best to start building bridges with everyone. "
Further commentary is document in pages 4-7 of the PDF. The rest is a potpourri of commentary of other American issues such as Gary Faulkner's journey, Holbrooke's meetings, and American policies.
With popular protests having defeated the authoritarian regimes that once held power in Egypt and Tunisia and (hopefully) bringing the reign of Qaddafi to a terminal conclusion, speculate on which regime will fall next. Much of the speculation focuses on the remaining tyrants in the Maghreb and those on the Arabian Peninsula.
In light of this discussion, I present to you Dissidents in the Arabian Peninsula by the [redacted] analyst(s) with the Office of Political Analysis. In this 24-page study, the CIA documented the activities of anti-regime dissidents, the response of regimes to these activities, and the influence of outside factors such as exile and foreign government support. Based on this study, the following reaction to popular protest and rebellion can be expected from Arabian Peninsula regimes:
Arabian Peninsula regimes like the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia will employ their wealth to temper down opposition. This has already been seen in Bahrain where the King has given out cash payments to his subjects.
Renewed and increased security cooperation between Arabian Peninsula governments particularly those in the Gulf Community Council. Dissidents will no longer find the same level of tolerance in exile as they have previously.
Iran will be of a great concern due to their size and shared religion with the large number of Shia Muslims in Bahrain, Eastern Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.
However, in reading this document, remember the following differences:
Neighboring nations, most notably Egypt, have successfully booted out their entrench dictators.
The countries and entities that fueled the revolts and protests in the document are under pressure themselves. Libya is in the midst a full-scale revolt teetering on civil war, while Iran and the PLO (Palestinian Authority) are facing their own popular revolts.
Interested in how corporations see themselves and write their histories? Curious as to how the military annexes of Corporate America seduce and win the love, the approval, and the contracts of the establishment? Wonder no more as I have acquired and posted the National Security Agency's ARC registrations of three of the most notorious private military contractors on the planet: Blackwater USA, Triple Canopy, and Dyncorp International. As these document show, these companies seek the blessing of the National Security Agency through tales do-erring, elite skills, and SCIFs and cleared staffs.
Facing what may be the most serious challenge to his reign since seizing power in 1969, Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi is, not surprisingly, lashing out at his opposition with a great deal of force, with reports of snipers, mercenaries, and the military all being deployed to smash those aligned against him. This is keeping with Kaddafi's style which at one time included dispatching his security and intelligence apparatus abroad to hunt down and eliminate exile opposition and to monitor the Libyan diaspora in order to thwart and deter the formation of threats to his regime.
This Document of the Week is a 12/15/1993 Counterterrorist Center Commentary from the Director of Central Intelligence’s Counterterrorist Center regarding the disappearance of Mansur Kikhia who was mostly likely abducted by Libyan security services while in Cairo for a meeting of a Arab human rights group and with members of his family. Mansur Kikhia's disappearance has never been resolved, nor have many of the assassinations and vanishings of other exiled Libyan leaders, activists, and opponents of Qaddafi's regime.
If Qaddafi survive, inevitably those opposing him will be driven into exile and likely hunted in a renewed effort to stamp out diasporic opposition to the Libyan dictator.
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