Skyjacking: A CIA Analysis and History

N.B.- I know that I have promised several of my readers that I was going to cut down on Scribd uploads. I intend to do so. However, I had already scanned this document and Google Documents refuses to accept it. Thus I have no choice.

As for the record itself, it is a July 1982 CIA study on “terrorist skyjacking”. The use of “Skyjacking” to describe airline hijackings makes this report worthwhile by itself because SKYJACKING is a boss word and deserves to be resurrected from its linguistic purgatory.

More seriously, this 24-page CIA report is a statistical study with historical commentary on the rise and prevalence of terrorist skyjackings and presumably garden-variety skyjackings since the first “terrorist skyjacking” took place in 1968 when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) seized an El-Al jet liner.(1) The CIA's statistics reveal a great deal of common wisdom challenging information:

As documented by the CIA, 9% of all terrorist attacks were skyjackings. The 684 skyjackings between 1968 and 1982 resulted in at least 500 deaths and 400 injuries. Of the 684 skyjackings, the CIA ruled 108 of them “terrorist skyjackings” and that these terrorist skyjackings. Among these 108, forty turned violent with the end result being 212 dead and 186 wounded.

So, contrary to popular wisdom, the pre-911 skyjackings were not necessarily safe nor simply affairs to draw media attention to one's cause or to procure the release of one's comrades.

While terrorist skyjackings were done by many groups for both attention and to secure the release of their members, the bulk of the hijackings were done by Palestinians.

Between 1968- July 1982:

Cuba was the most common diversion point. Cuba also granted safe haven to terrorist skyjackers the most often.

Lebanon was the most frequent point of origin for hijacked aircraft as well as the skyjackers' most frequently boarding point

While only 7% of skyjackings occurred in the North America, American aircraft were the most often skyjacked.

So again, the post-911 narrative that Americans had little experience with foreign terrorism is explicitly challenged and even debunked.

Sprinkled throughout the paper are some nifty graphics, one of which reveals a steep and briefly sustain drop-off in terrorist skyjackings in response to new security measures such as metal detectors.

On a final note, some caution is required when reading this report. The CIA itself admits to using “incomplete data” and I know that the CIA is incorrect in describing two incidents listed in this report.

First, only five Croatians were released during the 1972 hijacking in Sweden and secondly, only four Croatians and the American wife of the ringleader hijacked TWA-355 in September 1976.

Terrorist Skyjackings: A CIA Report

(1)Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 67

Al-Qaeda's Code Book

For some reason, INSCOM sent me the portion of the Encyclopedia of Jihad dealing with codes, ciphers, and encryption.  I am not one to let documents go to waste, so I have posted it for reader enjoyment.

al-Qaeda's Cypher Manual

NSA and the Recorded Future

This is the NSA's ARC registration entry for “Recorded Future.” The National Security Agency released this a while ago but public interest in the company waned, so I never got around to posting it. Until now. 

NSA's ARC Entry For Recorded Future

Elizabeth Edwards Has No FBI File

Elizabeth Edwards, John Edwards' wife, does not have her own FBI file. However, I suspect she's present in her husband's undoubtedly substantial file. We'll find out after his death.

Elizabeth Edwards No FBI Record Letter

The Remnants of Edvard Kardelj's FBI File

Edvard Kardelj was a former vice-president of Yugoslavia, a senior Partisan commander, and one of the leading post-second-world-war Communist intellectuals. Despite this, on December 16, 2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigation destroyed all but fifteen pages of their records pertaining to him. According to the Bureau, the only records that survived are fifteen pages pertaining to the 9/29/1977- 10/5/1977 visit by Kardelj to the United States.

The records are worthless for scholarship due to the extensive redactions made to them on the b(1), that is the information according to the FOIA statute, is “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy”. Judging from the markings on the surviving documents, the information that is being redacted is classified “Secret” meaning its release would cause “serious damage” to American national security. In the FBI's opinion, I cannot be not allowed to see the FBI's information on Kardelj because it would compromise American national security, yet, somehow the same information can confined to the wastebasket without the least harm to American national security.

Edvard Kardelj's File File

Document of the Week #12 CIA History of the Rwandan Genocide

The CIA's Office of Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis's 9/18/1999 Intelligence Report titled “Rwanda Struggling to Overcome Genocidal Past” is a well-written, and generally all-round stellar short-history of the Rwandan Genocide. Highlights of this document include

The author's clear, unequivocal rejection of the belief that the genocide "was a release of centuries-old ethnic hatreds.

The author's unhesitating assignment of responsibility to the guilty party.

The blunt, factual, and evidence-supported description of the genocide and the reasons behind the genocide.

In short, the author shows, the Rwandan Genocide was not the product of uncontrolled blood lust and ethnic hatreds, but was the cruel, cold, and well-thought plot of Hutu extremists fearing their lose of power and privilege. 

Rwanda Struggling to Overcome Genocidal Past

CIA Thoughts on the Homeland and Bosnian Wars

The following NIEs on the Bosnian War and Homeland War were recently declassified and given to me by the CIA in response to a FOIA request that I had submitted.

 

NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]

Issued in May 1993, this nine- page, classified “Secret” document gives insight into the CIA's pessimistic view for Bosnia's prospects and of the Bosnian government. The document reveals that the

The CIA believed that maintaining Bosnia's integrity after the implementation of a Vance-Owen Plan would require a commitment of time and resources on par with that made to South Korea after the Korean War.

The CIA believed that the “Muslims” were capable of “creat[ing] violent incidents that could be blamed on the Serbs and Croats.”

And the language of the NIE also shows that the CIA held the Bosnian government as being little better than the VRS and HVO it fought. In addition to the above “Muslims” and “Serbs and Croats,” another part of the NIE referes to the “Bosnian Serb Army” and the “Muslim-dominated Bosnian Army.”

NIE 93-22 Prospects for Bosnia

Update Memorandum on NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]

This five- page memorandum, classified “Secret” is an update to the May 1993 NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]. The highlights of this document include

The CIA's belief that a Bosnia divided as intended by the Vance-Owen Plan would not survive long.

The CIA's opinion that the Europeans would not remained engage long in Bosnia if the United States refused to get involved.

Update Memo NIE-93-22

NIE 93-26 Croatia:When Will Fighting Resume?

This eleven-page, classified “Secret” document is a July 1993 National Intelligence Estimate on the probability of renewed warfare in Croatia during the lull in the Homeland War, the reaction of Serbia to such fighting, and the impact such violence would have on Bosnia, Croatia, and the world.

The CIA believed there was “less than even chance” of a peaceful settlement of the Homeland War and that the Croatians would hold if ti sensed progress in negotiations with the RSK.

The Croatian diaspora, particularly the “Herzegovinian Mafia”, were driving the HDZ and Franjo Tudjman's nationalist agenda,

The West's influence had and was continuing to keep the Croatians from restarting the Homeland War beyond the minor skirmishes.

Finally, it appears that the CIA was aware of Croatian military actions that appear to be mobilization and preparation for the Medak Pocket Operation.

NIE 93-26 Croatia:When Will Fighting Resume?

NIE 93-23/I Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia

This thirteen-page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the first part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. Among the more interesting points contained with this document are:

The horrible CIA-produced map on page 4 of the Estimate

The CIA's referral to the Bosnian government as “factional leaders” on par with the HVO and VRS.

The CIA's belief that the Bosnian government would attacks Western targets and frame the Serbs.

The CIA's ultimately mistaken belief that the HVO, with Croatian military assistance, could hold on to captured territory indefinitely.

The attention given to the possible threat to Serbia's neighbors by that nation's military force. The CIA estimated that Macedonia, Hungry, and Bulgaria would all need outside assistance to beat Serbia while the much larger Romanian military

NIE 93-23/I Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia

NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia\II

This sixty-eight page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the concluding part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. It has more detailed analysis of the points brought up in volume I of NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia.

The most interesting aspect of this document is the attention given to the prospect for terrorism by or on behalf of the Bosnian government Or the “Bosnian Muslims” as the CIA would term it while ignoring prior acts of Serbian terrorism such as the bombings and hijackings by individuals such as Nikola Kavaja and the limited description of Croatian terrorism such as the 1980 bombing of the Statue of Liberty and the 9/10 Hijacking of TWA-355 both acts which were intended to bring about an independent Croatian state.

NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia Volume II