Elizabeth Edwards, John Edwards' wife, does not have her own FBI file. However, I suspect she's present in her husband's undoubtedly substantial file. We'll find out after his death.
Tuesday, April 12, 2011
Monday, April 11, 2011
The Remnants of Edvard Kardelj's FBI File
Edvard Kardelj was a former vice-president of Yugoslavia, a senior Partisan commander, and one of the leading post-second-world-war Communist intellectuals. Despite this, on December 16, 2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigation destroyed all but fifteen pages of their records pertaining to him. According to the Bureau, the only records that survived are fifteen pages pertaining to the 9/29/1977- 10/5/1977 visit by Kardelj to the United States.
The records are worthless for scholarship due to the extensive redactions made to them on the b(1), that is the information according to the FOIA statute, is “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy”. Judging from the markings on the surviving documents, the information that is being redacted is classified “Secret” meaning its release would cause “serious damage” to American national security. In the FBI's opinion, I cannot be not allowed to see the FBI's information on Kardelj because it would compromise American national security, yet, somehow the same information can confined to the wastebasket without the least harm to American national security.
Document of the Week #12 CIA History of the Rwandan Genocide
The CIA's Office of Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis's 9/18/1999 Intelligence Report titled “Rwanda Struggling to Overcome Genocidal Past” is a well-written, and generally all-round stellar short-history of the Rwandan Genocide. Highlights of this document include
The author's clear, unequivocal rejection of the belief that the genocide "was a release of centuries-old ethnic hatreds.
The author's unhesitating assignment of responsibility to the guilty party.
The blunt, factual, and evidence-supported description of the genocide and the reasons behind the genocide.
In short, the author shows, the Rwandan Genocide was not the product of uncontrolled blood lust and ethnic hatreds, but was the cruel, cold, and well-thought plot of Hutu extremists fearing their lose of power and privilege.
Wednesday, March 30, 2011
CIA Thoughts on the Homeland and Bosnian Wars
The following NIEs on the Bosnian War and Homeland War were recently declassified and given to me by the CIA in response to a FOIA request that I had submitted.
NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]
Issued in May 1993, this nine- page, classified “Secret” document gives insight into the CIA's pessimistic view for Bosnia's prospects and of the Bosnian government. The document reveals that the
The CIA believed that maintaining Bosnia's integrity after the implementation of a Vance-Owen Plan would require a commitment of time and resources on par with that made to South Korea after the Korean War.
The CIA believed that the “Muslims” were capable of “creat[ing] violent incidents that could be blamed on the Serbs and Croats.”
And the language of the NIE also shows that the CIA held the Bosnian government as being little better than the VRS and HVO it fought. In addition to the above “Muslims” and “Serbs and Croats,” another part of the NIE referes to the “Bosnian Serb Army” and the “Muslim-dominated Bosnian Army.”
Update Memorandum on NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]
This five- page memorandum, classified “Secret” is an update to the May 1993 NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]. The highlights of this document include
The CIA's belief that a Bosnia divided as intended by the Vance-Owen Plan would not survive long.
The CIA's opinion that the Europeans would not remained engage long in Bosnia if the United States refused to get involved.
NIE 93-26 Croatia:When Will Fighting Resume?
This eleven-page, classified “Secret” document is a July 1993 National Intelligence Estimate on the probability of renewed warfare in Croatia during the lull in the Homeland War, the reaction of Serbia to such fighting, and the impact such violence would have on Bosnia, Croatia, and the world.
The CIA believed there was “less than even chance” of a peaceful settlement of the Homeland War and that the Croatians would hold if ti sensed progress in negotiations with the RSK.
The Croatian diaspora, particularly the “Herzegovinian Mafia”, were driving the HDZ and Franjo Tudjman's nationalist agenda,
The West's influence had and was continuing to keep the Croatians from restarting the Homeland War beyond the minor skirmishes.
Finally, it appears that the CIA was aware of Croatian military actions that appear to be mobilization and preparation for the Medak Pocket Operation.
NIE 93-23/I Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia
This thirteen-page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the first part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. Among the more interesting points contained with this document are:
The horrible CIA-produced map on page 4 of the Estimate
The CIA's referral to the Bosnian government as “factional leaders” on par with the HVO and VRS.
The CIA's belief that the Bosnian government would attacks Western targets and frame the Serbs.
The CIA's ultimately mistaken belief that the HVO, with Croatian military assistance, could hold on to captured territory indefinitely.
The attention given to the possible threat to Serbia's neighbors by that nation's military force. The CIA estimated that Macedonia, Hungry, and Bulgaria would all need outside assistance to beat Serbia while the much larger Romanian military
NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia\II
This sixty-eight page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the concluding part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. It has more detailed analysis of the points brought up in volume I of NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia.
The most interesting aspect of this document is the attention given to the prospect for terrorism by or on behalf of the Bosnian government Or the “Bosnian Muslims” as the CIA would term it while ignoring prior acts of Serbian terrorism such as the bombings and hijackings by individuals such as Nikola Kavaja and the limited description of Croatian terrorism such as the 1980 bombing of the Statue of Liberty and the 9/10 Hijacking of TWA-355 both acts which were intended to bring about an independent Croatian state.
NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia Volume II
NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia Volume II
Sunday, March 27, 2011
Document of the Week #10 CIA Study on Pariah States and Sub-Saharan African Governments
If you're curious as to why the African Union and other Sub-Saharan African governments have provided so much support for Qaddafi and his efforts to maintain power check out this 9/9/1998 Intelligence Report from the CIA's Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis titled Sub-Saharan Africa: Seeking Pragmatic Relations with Rogue States.
CIA report on Sub-Saharan African states relations with Libya and Other Rogue States
CIA report on Sub-Saharan African states relations with Libya and Other Rogue States
Thursday, March 24, 2011
No Logo, No Interest: The FBI Does Not Share CSIS's Interest in No Logo
In Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalization Debate, Naomi Klein recounts her less than thrilled" reaction to the revelation that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was reading her book, No Logo, for information on the Alter-globalization movement. Curious, I had a FOIA request submitted for information regarding No Logo to the FBI.
As seen below, while Mrs. Klein may have an FBI file, No Logo itself appears to have been of no interest to the FBI. Lest you think this was a fool's errand and a waste of FOIA resource, one need only remember that the “Anarchist Cookbook” has a substantial FBI file.
Friday, March 11, 2011
The Pakistan Media's Take On the Stanley McChrystal Firing
While Matthew Hastings' article on the shenanigans and poor attitude of General Stanley McCrystal and his staff provoked a great deal of heated debate. Leading scions of media criticized Hasting for how he obtained his information, for the fact that he reported on the matter at all. Even Hastings' patriotism was questioned. Obama's decision to remove McCrystal provided controversy as well.
In contrast, mainstream Pakistani media enthusiastically approved of Obama's dismissal of McChrystal. A June 25, 2010 cable from the American Embassy in Islamabad to the Secretary of State on the big stories in the Pakistani media documented the reaction of mainstream Pakistani media. Below are the choice selections of the reactions captured by the US Embassy in Islamabad:
Editorial: Institutions Above Individuals, an editorial in the populist, often sensational national English daily "The News" (cir. 55,000) (06 /25)
The dismissal of a top-ranking general by the U.S. President may be an unusual event, but, as President Obama has said, the tough decision, taken at a vital point in the nine-year war in Afghanistan, drives home the importance of institutions and the fact that they are more important than individuals.... The U.S. military, despite its strength and size, has through time developed sufficient maturity to keep itself aloof from affairs of government and to accept decisions made by Presidents. This has a long background of institution-building, with the dismissal of General Douglas McArthur in the 1950s too resulting in no disruption in U.S. affairs; there was no coup d'etat, no warning statements from the men in uniform.
The tradition of civilian authority held firm.... The wider impact of the change in command in Afghanistan is yet not known. Pakistan will be watching events to its west attentively, given that developments in Afghanistan have a direct impact on the war against militancy at home. Only time will tell if there is to be any change and the nature of this if one does indeed occur.
Editorial: The FaIl Of A General, an editorial. in the center-right national English daily "The Nation" (cir. 20,000) (06 / 25)
"If the top commander in a theatre of war entertains disparaging views of the civilian bosses, there would be a disconnect between the two in this vital matter. McChrystal's exit, no doubt establishes civilian control over the military - a fundamental principle of democratic set-ups - but, as the General has supporters both in the armed forces and civilian institutions, like for instance, Congress, it is not going to be smooth sailing for the President. However, with President Obama asserting, "it is a change in personnel-, but it is not a change in policy", one should not expect a much more different outcome of the war when General David Petraeus takes over.... Did the realization that the war efforts have come up against a dead-end cause McChrystal frustration and also lead him to adopt this questionable attitude?"
Opinion: McChrystal's Sacking And Afghan Endgame, an op-ed by Shafqat Mahmood in the populist, often sensational national English daily "The News" (cir. 55,000) (06/25)
"More than the notion of establishing civilian supremacy, it was important for the first black president in U.S. history to assert his authority over the military.... People like McChrystal argued that to make the Taliban amenable to negotiations, they have to be put under pressure. This view prevailed despite opposition. Hence, the troop surge and the operation in Helmand and another in the works for Kandahar. The first operation has been unsuccessful and the second will fare no better. The Taliban will perhaps negotiate but on their own terms. The demand on Pakistan is strange. On the one hand, we are being asked to launch a military operation against the Taliban in North Waziristan and apprehend them in other places if they are here. And, on the other, there is a desire for us to facilitate dialogue with them. Thus, they are asking us to attack those who they want us to help become friends with. These and other contradictions will play themselves out in the next two years. Since
it is in the vital interest of Pakistan to have a friendly Afghanistan, we will have to broaden our links to all the Afghan people. The Americans will leave but we have to live here. It is best to start building bridges with everyone. "
Further commentary is document in pages 4-7 of the PDF. The rest is a potpourri of commentary of other American issues such as Gary Faulkner's journey, Holbrooke's meetings, and American policies.
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