For fans of the publicly mild-mannered Tom Bosley, a gentleman best-known for playing “Mr. C.” on the hit TV show “Happy Days” and Father Frank Dowling on “Father Dowling Mysteries ” it is probably a shock to discover Mr. Bosley possessed a FBI file. The FBI confirmed this in response to a FOIA request this author had submitted to the FBI after the public announcement of Mr. Bosley's demise.
Thanks to the much criticized FBI record retention schedule, it appears that the American public will forever denied access to and knowledge of the contents of Mr. Bosley's FBI file and the events which led to its creation. Like Bobby Thomson, we are left to speculate as to whether Bosley was a suspected or actual communist or “fellow traveler,” a victim of an obsessed or crazed fan, or just a peripheral figure in an investigation of which even he might have been unaware.
Despite extensive media coverage and public comment, in response to a recent FOIA request, the National Security Agency has declared that it will “neither confirm nor deny,” possessing information or records pertaining to the “Underwear Bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and Northwest Airlines Flight 253.
Much has been made over the last week as WikiLeaks has been releasing portions of what is believed to be a cache of over 250,000 State Department cables believed to have been given to them by Pfc. Bradley Manning.
However, below is evidence that at least one of the cables was previously released by State Department itself creating the possibly other cables were also be declassified by the State Department through mechanism like FOIA and the Mandatory Declassification Review Process.
The cable in question is 75TEHRAN2069 Click the link to access the WikiLeaks' version of it. Below is the electronic copy of it released to the National Archives by the State Department and available through the National Archives' NARA's Access to Archival Databases (AAD). Except for formating and the decision by WikiLeaks (I presume) to call the cable 75TEHRAN2069 instead of 74TEHRAN02069, the cable content is exact. (Of course the dropped "0" could mean that WikiLeaks or Manning altered the documents, but I doub this.)
As the cables are released, it would be fruitful to compare them to cables in the State Department's Electronic Reading Room and the National Archives to see how many have been previously released. Scholars should also consult their personal archives and post any relevant cables that they have had given to them by the State Department
Below is what I believe is a small sampling of the State Department's cable traffic regarding the world's reaction to the 9-11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
These cables, largely unredacted, provide an inside look into how the world, foreign governments, and the staff at American embassy reacted to the horrors of that day.
For example, the cable traffic from the US Embassy in Austria reveals the Austrian government moved quickly to protect the US Embassy while an Austrian phone company moved to provide free calling to the United States. An Algerian Minister wept at the destruction, while the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) broke a years-long "boycott?" and ignoring of the US Embassy and sent its condolences. Embassies throughout the world, embassies reported being inundated by expressions of support from the people, governments, and organizations in the lands in which they represented America. This was not limited to America's allies; nations with whom the United States had been recently or relatively recent conflict- Lebanon/Hizbullah- Vietnam-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia- also expressed their regards.
Not everyone was saddened by the events of 9-11. The American Embassy in Beirut reported on "celebratory" gun fire in the Lebanese city of Tripoli. However, it is important to know that Arabs and Muslims were not the only people lauding the destruction of the World Trade Center. The American Embassy Belgrade received taunting phone calls of supporters of the 9-11 attacks, probably right-wing or fascist Serbs disgruntled by the drubbings administered to them by the US military in Bosnia and two years before in Kosovo. US Embassy Manila informed Foggy Bottom that a group of diasporic Filipino Communists in the Netherlands engaged in victim blaming, holding American foreign policy to response for occurred on 9-11.
The highly redacted cables from the US Embassies in China and Uzbekistan tell us that plotting for the eventual American reaction was already a foot within twenty-four hours of the attacks. The relevant data is edited but given the geographic locations of both those nations, I think it is safe to assume they are talking about Afghanistan.
A final note. There is nothing contained within these cables that provides any aid or comfort to the 9-11 truth movement. Sorry.
Recently, I FOIAed the Central Intelligence Agency seeking “copies of all records [for] current or previous plans to assassinate Julian Assange, Australian national and spokesman for Wikileaks.org. Again, despite my prior experience with the CIA refusing to confirm or deny a plot to kill Glenn Beck, I honestly expected the CIA to issue a firm “no records” response to my request. Again, I was shocked at the response I did receive.
The CIA invoked the “Glomar” response and has chosen to “neither confirm nor deny” any records pertaining to any CIA plot to kill Julian Assange on the grounds that such records, if they exist, “is intelligence sources and methods information that is protected from disclosure”
Honestly, I do not believe the theories going around claiming the CIA is out to get Assange or has anything to do with his residence problems in Sweden or the molestation and rape allegations he faces there. However, in light of the dubious decisions to employ Glomar in response to this request and Obama's proclamation that he has the right to assassinate Americans without judicial review makes me less sympathetic to CIA complaints of being misunderstood or portrayed in a bad light by conspiracy theories.
In January 1951, C.E. Hennrich, of the FBI, sent a memorandum to A.H. Belmont, of the FBI in which he argued that the FBI should “undertake no active investigation of Yugoslav immigrants and displaced persons who have been members of or associated with the Fascist Ustashi elements in World War II unless their activities after arriving in the United States appear to be inimical to the internal security.” Hennrich instead proposed that all “such allegations” be referred to INS for such action as is deemed advisable with the comment that the Bureau contemplates no investigation unless subsequent information indicates the subject's activities after arriving in the United Sates appear to be inimical to the internal security.” Hennrich stated that because of “the hatred between the Serbs and Croats,” which was “well-known,” and based on “political and religious difference which antecede World War II by many years.” and “the historical desire of the Croats for a separate state,” not all Ustashi were fascists. Hennrich also believed it was “expedient” for Croatians to support the German occupation and the Ustashi due to the former's occupation and the other's alliance with the Nazis.1 No formal response to this memorandum can be found in the FBI records at the National Archives or amongst the records I have had declassified. However, the cases of Janko Tortic and Andrija
Artukovic reveals a pattern of FBI behavior that indicates that this proposal was implemented. I will blog about this case in a forthcoming post.
Without a doubt, once Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown, the American focus on the former Yugoslavia rapidly began to wane. This trend was furthered by the timing of Milosevic’s overthrow which occurred just a month before the 2000 American elections which eventually brought George W. Bush and a stated disdain for both the American interventions in the Balkans specifically and nation-building more generally into power. 9-11 accelerated the disengagement and made it permanent.
Confirming this is a final response letter recently sent out by the CIA in which they admit to having created no National Intelligence Estimates between 10/2000 and 10/2001 on Serbia or the rump Yugoslavia. NIEs are described by the CIA as being, “the most authoritative written judgment concerning a national security issue prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence” and “are addressed to the highest level of policymakers-up to and including the President.” The creation of a NIE indicates significant interest from senior American leaders. While the lack of a NIE does not mean a total disengagement from an issue, it does indicate a less priority and importance has been placed upon it
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