CIA Will "Neither Confirm nor Deny" Planning to Kill WikiLeaks Founder

Recently, I FOIAed the Central Intelligence Agency seeking “copies of all records [for] current or previous plans to assassinate Julian Assange, Australian national and spokesman for Wikileaks.org. Again, despite my prior experience with the CIA refusing to confirm or deny a plot to kill Glenn Beck, I honestly expected the CIA to issue a firm “no records” response to my request. Again, I was shocked at the response I did receive.

The CIA invoked the “Glomar” response and has chosen to “neither confirm nor deny” any records pertaining to any CIA plot to kill Julian Assange on the grounds that such records, if they exist, “is intelligence sources and methods information that is protected from disclosure”

Honestly, I do not believe the theories going around claiming the CIA is out to get Assange or has anything to do with his residence problems in Sweden or the molestation and rape allegations he faces there. However, in light of the dubious decisions to employ Glomar in response to this request and Obama's proclamation that he has the right to assassinate Americans without judicial review makes me less sympathetic to CIA complaints of being misunderstood or portrayed in a bad light by conspiracy theories.

CIA Response to Assange Assassination FOIA

The FBI's Ustasha Stand Down Order

In January 1951, C.E. Hennrich, of the FBI, sent a memorandum to A.H. Belmont, of the FBI in which he argued that the FBI should “undertake no active investigation of Yugoslav immigrants and displaced persons who have been members of or associated with the Fascist Ustashi elements in World War II unless their activities after arriving in the United States appear to be inimical to the internal security.” Hennrich instead proposed that all “such allegations” be referred to INS for such action as is deemed advisable with the comment that the Bureau contemplates no investigation unless subsequent information indicates the subject's activities after arriving in the United Sates appear to be inimical to the internal security.” Hennrich stated that because of “the hatred between the Serbs and Croats,” which was “well-known,” and based on “political and religious difference which antecede World War II by many years.” and “the historical desire of the Croats for a separate state,” not all Ustashi were fascists. Hennrich also believed it was “expedient” for Croatians to support the German occupation and the Ustashi due to the former's occupation and the other's alliance with the Nazis.¹ No formal response to this memorandum can be found in the FBI records at the National Archives or amongst the records I have had declassified. However, the cases of Janko Tortic and Andrija

Artukovic reveals a pattern of FBI behavior that indicates that this proposal was implemented. I will blog about this case in a forthcoming post.  

Ustasha Stand Down Order

The Lack of a Post- Milosevic NIE and What it Means

Without a doubt, once Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown, the American focus on the former Yugoslavia rapidly began to wane. This trend was furthered by the timing of Milosevic’s overthrow which occurred just a month before the 2000 American elections which eventually brought George W. Bush and a stated disdain for both the American interventions in the Balkans specifically and nation-building more generally into power. 9-11 accelerated the disengagement and made it permanent.


Confirming this is a final response letter recently sent out by the CIA in which they admit to having created no National Intelligence Estimates between 10/2000 and 10/2001 on Serbia or the rump Yugoslavia. NIEs are described by the CIA as being, “the most authoritative written judgment concerning a national security issue prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence” and “are addressed to the highest level of policymakers-up to and including the President.” The creation of a NIE indicates significant interest from senior American leaders. While the lack of a NIE does not mean a total disengagement from an issue, it does indicate a less priority and importance has been placed upon it
 
CIA No Record Response

The Center for Cryptologic History Mission and Function Statements

The Center for Cryptologic History is a National Security Agency component and historical organization dedicated, as shown by their mission statement below, to the preservation and promoting of cryptologic history, particularly, but not limited to, the history of the NSA.
As for their mission and function statements, the NSA has given the CCH a concise, well-defined mission and function statements which are then broken down in further detail. However, with both a mission and function statement coming in at less than two pages, the CCH's purpose is tightly focused.

The statements also provided a list of documents that a FOIA user might be inclined to acquire such as its "partnership reports" and annual reports.CCH Mission Statement

More Missives From the Opaque Boss: More on NSA DIRgrams

During the summer, I posted a partial list of DIRgrams, messages produced by then National Security Agency director Michael Hayden to his NSA/CSS minions. Shortly thereafter, the NSA opted to declassified with token redactions on b(3) grounds(8), another document that, when combined with the record I first posted here, presents the some total of DIRgrams produced by Hayden and his successsor General Keith Alexander.

(*) Some redactions were made on non-responsive grounds, but this did not result in the redaction of DIRgram data.

NSA DIRgram List part Deux

Branko Peshelj's Newly Released FBI Files

Branko Peshelj was a member of the Croatian Peasant Party and advisor to its long time leader Vladko Macek. He was also an American government employee and informant to the FBI. Combined this makes him one of the more important Croatian emigres during the post-Second World War period.

However, only a portion of his FBI files were released as part of Interagency Working Group efforts. Back when I was doing archival research, I pressed the NARA staff to release for more of his records. This summer, I achieved the success seen below. I was also informed another of Peshelj's FBI files was being dispatched to NARA. While this will force me to miss work to hop over there and acquire it, it just seems tacky, after all my bitching, not to grab it.

New Branko Peshelj Files

Milovan Djilas' State Department Obituary

Here is the United States State Department’s “obituary” for famed Yugoslav Communist Leader Milovan Djilas.

United States State Department Cable Regarding the Death of Djilas

This 4/21/1995 cable from the US Embassy in Belgrade is succinct, poignant, and a complete contrast how the US Embassy in Belgrade treated Djilas while he was alive. As noted by Warren Zimmerman, the last Ambassador to Tito’s Yugoslavia, it was American policy not recognize Djilas so long as Tito was alive. This policy survived Tito. It was not until Zimmerman that Djilas actually met with the American ambassador.