The Yugoslav Communists Reflect on American Communists

The Yugoslav Communists were harsh critics of American Communists. As shown by this 11/9/1965 cable from the US Embassy in Belgrade, the Yugoslav Communists viewed the Communist Party USA as an "alien body" within the United States due to the Communist Party USA's adherence to Moscow's dictates. The Yugoslavs also felt that the Communist Party USA was flawed in its analysis of American society. The opinion of the Communist Party USA was so low, that the Yugoslavs avoided it and opted to establish direct relations with the American trade unions.

Yugoslav Government Thoughts on USCP

Lukewarm Pursuit: The US Army Investigates Wikileaks

On December 3, 2007, the assistant security manager of the 655th Regional Support Group was alerted by a unit member who reported finding a very detailed listing of 382nd Military Police Battalion has discovered a “very detailed listing of 382nd MP BN equipment on Wikileaks.org. (The report is still available here). The assistant security manager alerted his chain of command as well as the 94 RRC (Regional Readiness Reserve Commands) Command Security Manager. The 94 RCC Security Manager alerted Mr. [Redacted] seeking guidance on which law enforcement and or military intelligence units had to be contacted. Permission was also requested for the incident to be included in the 94 RCC Security Manager’s OPSEC (Operational Security) briefing.

On December 7, 2007, The agent who created the “Agent’s Activity Summary” stated that he was going to contact the West Point CID (Criminal Investigation Division ) to determine whether the Active Duty CID had a plan in place for such contingencies.

While the Agent’s Activity Summary states, “I do know at this moment,” I believe what the Activity Summary agent meant to say was “I do not know at this moment…” based on his earlier statement about contacting West Point CID for direction on how to handle the incident. The agent listed a few possibilities: 902nd Military Intelligence (MI), the West Point CID Office, or possibly the JTTF or a MA fusion cell. He also expressed his “strong support” for inclusion in the OPSEC briefing. All this occurred between 8:30 when the Special- Agent- in- Charge [Redacted], Boston Fraud Resident Agency received an email from a Mr. {Redacted] Ani-terrorism officer that an listing of 382nd MP BN equipment had been posted on Wikileaks.

Shortly after noon on December 7th, West Point CID’s Special- Agent- in- Charge announced via email that it was decided the leak was an OPSEC issue and that the 902nd MI would have “investigative responsibility” and that if the 902nd MI needed assistance that the West Office would provide it. He also advised that West Point CID had no intention of beginning its own investigation into the matter.

At 5:15 December 7th, the Activity Summary agent received an “email string” from a MPRI (military professional Resources Inc. staffer attached with IMCOM- NE ATO, IMC, North East Region; Current Operations which reported that one of the assistant security managers at Ft. Devens “chanced upon” a British website which has placed the entire joint service TDA & TO&E for Iraq and Afghanistan theaters on their website. This appears to be a reference to the events of December 3, 2007 discussed in the first paragraph. The author of the email stated that he “feels certain” that “someone” in the DOD is aware of the situation that he is reporting but is reporting “this information” to Army CID so that Army CID could alert the DA (Department of Army) OPSEC POC (Point of Contact). A Ms. [redacted] is noted as having passed the information to the Joint OPSEC Support Center. Activity Summary Agent then reports his intention to close TAB but only after following up with 902nd MI. On December 17, 2007, the agent reports that Special Agent [redacted] told him that “he had attempted to follow-up by requesting the lists of equipment from the unit, which was pending. His initial position is that none of the equipment was sensitive and therefore not releasable. He [sic] agreed that it probably should not be [on?] a website, but it is an issue that his office will not further pursue.

The released records raise all sorts of questions. Did Bradley Manning have any involvement in this leak? I have not been able to turn up any information on his duty stations. I doubt it given Manning enlisted in 2007.

Why did the US Army allow for such a lackluster investigation? Granted the 902nd decided that the files that were leaked were not “not releasable,” that still didn’t prevent someone for being nailed for violating OPSEC. Or being discovered and monitored for future violations. As far as the Army goes this could possibly be a missed opportunity prevent the future Manning leaks to Wikileaks.

It has to be asked about how the persecution of Wikileaks. As I have previously, it seems that NCIS was barely interested in investigating Wikileaks. Now, we see that both the US Army CID and at least one unit of military intelligence were equally blasé about Wikileaks. Now maybe CID, NCIS, and US Army intelligence are out of the loop, or the decision to go after Wikileaks is recent. Cryptome has given time and attention to those who believe that Wikileaks might be a front to snare unsuspecting leakers.

Finally, why did the Army CID send me these records? Seriously, I did not request these records. I sought out the investigative records for a different Wikileaks leak investigation. Was this done in error?

Army CID Wikileaks Hunt

Praying Away the Gay: The Air Force Response

A while back, I requested copies of "all Air Force policies regarding therapy, reparative therapy, or reorientation therapy or any other method of "curing" or "converting" gays and lesbians (i.e. make them heterosexual) in relation to the issuing and holding of security clearances and the Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy."

I was curious to how the Air Force handle gays and lesbians who went off and prayed away the gay like Ted Haggard has done.

I recently received a response. I learned that the Air Force Central Adjudication Facility conducted a comprehensive search for responsive records, but none was found. Thus I received a "no records" determination is made. Interesting. Either the Air Force has never encountered "cured gays" or has yet to formulate a policy on handling them.

FBI Response to Bradley Manning Case FOIAs

Inspired by Glenn Greenwald's coverage of the arrest of Pfc Bradley Manning and the possible roll of Adrian Lamo and Kevin Poulsen in the matter, I had a couple of FOIA requests fired off to the FBI. Today, I received my answers.

My first request was for any contact between Wired Magazine and the FBI during the first few weeks of the Manning affair. As seen below, they came back with a "no records" response." Assuming they are being honest in both search and their reply means they had no interaction with Kevin Poulsen or any other member of the Wired staff.

FBI FOIA Letter Wired Contact

The second FOIA request was for the chat log between Adrian Lamo and Bradley Manning. This request was not even processed with the FBI invoking both men's right to privacy to justify their lack of search.

FBI FOIA Denial of Lamo Log

I intend to submit appeals on both requests. I am not sure the FBI is entire on the level or that their search was as effective as it could have been. As for the chat log, it should qualify for release as a legal record and the notoriety of both Adrian Lamo and Bradley Manning.

Hunter S. Thompson Did Not Have a CIA File

A while back, I sought out Hunter Thompson's CIA file. According to the final response posted below, Thompson did not draw the attention of the CIA. Odd.

CIA Final Response Letter RE Hunter Thompson

Foxy Knoxy Unclassified: The Amanda Knox State Department Cables

As I promised early, I have acquired seven cables pertaining to the arrest and trial of Amanda Knox. The first cable is December 2008 and the last from December 2009. The majority of the cables are redacted due to privacy concerns with the State Department invoking (b)(6) to justify withholding. Despite this, some aspects of the State Department's handling of this case can be puzzled out. Specifically:

1. The US Embassy in Rome is handling it. All of the released cables orginate from there.
2. It is a localized affair. All of the cables went to the American consulates in Milan, Naples, Florence, or to  ....
3. The State Department in Washington DC. The cables say "SECSTATE WASHDC," but it is doubtful that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton read any of them, at least at first. She may have read them since, but with the possible exception those marked IMMEDIATE. I believe all cable traffic is routed to the Secretary of State or more accurate State Department HQ.
4. Knox has received consular representation as required by international law. However, it does not appear that the State Department is pushing hard (or at all) for her release.

I should point out that the State Department reported there was an 8th record (most likely a cable) withheld its entirety on (b)(6) grounds. I also limited my search to cable traffic. A FOIA request for all Amanda Knox related records will probably turn up more information, probably some more recent cables, but not much more. If someone can get Knox to sign a release or file her own Privacy Act request, more information will become available.

I have loaded them in chronically, oldest to newest, with each page of the PDF being a separate page of a cable. On the bottom left front page of each cable is a line blacked out. I did that to remove identifying material about me.

Knox Cable Traffic

Missives From an Opaque Boss: NSA DIRgrams

Below is a listing of NSA "DIRgrams" (messages from the director of the NSA to his troops). Surprisingly, few of the DIRgrams (only ten) have been redacted. Of course, this does not mean a DIRgram will be released if requested through FOIA.

Some sample DIRgram titles:

181- Law Day
201- History Channel Poll (I blogged about this one here.)
239- Media Attention
242- NSA and GCHQ Policy on Cooperation and Sharing (Partnership)
312- Closure of Bad Aibling Station
333- Information Sharing with the United Kingdom and Australia

NSA DIRgram List

If anyone is interested in acquiring a particular DIRgram for themselves,  just use the NSA's online FOIA submission form and request them. From personal experience, you will receive a response relatively quickly.