CIA Thoughts on the Homeland and Bosnian Wars

The following NIEs on the Bosnian War and Homeland War were recently declassified and given to me by the CIA in response to a FOIA request that I had submitted.

 

NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]

Issued in May 1993, this nine- page, classified “Secret” document gives insight into the CIA's pessimistic view for Bosnia's prospects and of the Bosnian government. The document reveals that the

The CIA believed that maintaining Bosnia's integrity after the implementation of a Vance-Owen Plan would require a commitment of time and resources on par with that made to South Korea after the Korean War.

The CIA believed that the “Muslims” were capable of “creat[ing] violent incidents that could be blamed on the Serbs and Croats.”

And the language of the NIE also shows that the CIA held the Bosnian government as being little better than the VRS and HVO it fought. In addition to the above “Muslims” and “Serbs and Croats,” another part of the NIE referes to the “Bosnian Serb Army” and the “Muslim-dominated Bosnian Army.”

NIE 93-22 Prospects for Bosnia

Update Memorandum on NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]

This five- page memorandum, classified “Secret” is an update to the May 1993 NIE 93-22: Prospects for Bosnia [Redacted]. The highlights of this document include

The CIA's belief that a Bosnia divided as intended by the Vance-Owen Plan would not survive long.

The CIA's opinion that the Europeans would not remained engage long in Bosnia if the United States refused to get involved.

Update Memo NIE-93-22

NIE 93-26 Croatia:When Will Fighting Resume?

This eleven-page, classified “Secret” document is a July 1993 National Intelligence Estimate on the probability of renewed warfare in Croatia during the lull in the Homeland War, the reaction of Serbia to such fighting, and the impact such violence would have on Bosnia, Croatia, and the world.

The CIA believed there was “less than even chance” of a peaceful settlement of the Homeland War and that the Croatians would hold if ti sensed progress in negotiations with the RSK.

The Croatian diaspora, particularly the “Herzegovinian Mafia”, were driving the HDZ and Franjo Tudjman's nationalist agenda,

The West's influence had and was continuing to keep the Croatians from restarting the Homeland War beyond the minor skirmishes.

Finally, it appears that the CIA was aware of Croatian military actions that appear to be mobilization and preparation for the Medak Pocket Operation.

NIE 93-26 Croatia:When Will Fighting Resume?

NIE 93-23/I Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia

This thirteen-page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the first part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. Among the more interesting points contained with this document are:

The horrible CIA-produced map on page 4 of the Estimate

The CIA's referral to the Bosnian government as “factional leaders” on par with the HVO and VRS.

The CIA's belief that the Bosnian government would attacks Western targets and frame the Serbs.

The CIA's ultimately mistaken belief that the HVO, with Croatian military assistance, could hold on to captured territory indefinitely.

The attention given to the possible threat to Serbia's neighbors by that nation's military force. The CIA estimated that Macedonia, Hungry, and Bulgaria would all need outside assistance to beat Serbia while the much larger Romanian military

NIE 93-23/I Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia

NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia\II

This sixty-eight page, classified “Secret” estimate was issued in July 1993 and is the concluding part of a two-part estimate on the combat capacity of the forces fighting in Bosnian War. It has more detailed analysis of the points brought up in volume I of NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia.

The most interesting aspect of this document is the attention given to the prospect for terrorism by or on behalf of the Bosnian government Or the “Bosnian Muslims” as the CIA would term it while ignoring prior acts of Serbian terrorism such as the bombings and hijackings by individuals such as Nikola Kavaja and the limited description of Croatian terrorism such as the 1980 bombing of the Statue of Liberty and the 9/10 Hijacking of TWA-355 both acts which were intended to bring about an independent Croatian state.

NIE 93-23/II Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia Volume II

Document of the Week #10 CIA Study on Pariah States and Sub-Saharan African Governments

If you're curious as to why the African Union and other Sub-Saharan African governments have provided so much support for Qaddafi and his efforts to maintain power check out this 9/9/1998 Intelligence Report from the CIA's Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis titled Sub-Saharan Africa: Seeking Pragmatic Relations with Rogue States.

CIA report on  Sub-Saharan African states relations with Libya and Other Rogue States

Document of the Week #7 CIA Study of Widespread Arab Protests from 1980

With popular protests having defeated the authoritarian regimes that once held power in Egypt and Tunisia and (hopefully) bringing the reign of Qaddafi to a terminal conclusion, speculate on which regime will fall next. Much of the speculation focuses on the remaining tyrants in the Maghreb and those on the Arabian Peninsula.

In light of this discussion, I present to you Dissidents in the Arabian Peninsula by the [redacted] analyst(s) with the Office of Political Analysis. In this 24-page study, the CIA documented the activities of anti-regime dissidents, the response of regimes to these activities, and the influence of outside factors such as exile and foreign government support. Based on this study, the following reaction to popular protest and rebellion can be expected from Arabian Peninsula regimes:

1. Arabian Peninsula regimes like the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia will employ their wealth to temper down opposition. This has already been seen in Bahrain where the King has given out cash payments to his subjects.
2. Renewed and increased security cooperation between Arabian Peninsula governments particularly those in the Gulf Community Council. Dissidents will no longer find the same level of tolerance in exile as they have previously.
3. Iran will be of a great concern due to their size and shared religion with the large number of Shia Muslims in Bahrain, Eastern Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

However, in reading this document, remember the following differences:

1. Neighboring nations, most notably Egypt, have successfully booted out their entrench dictators.
2. The countries and entities that fueled the revolts and protests in the document are under pressure themselves. Libya is in the midst a full-scale revolt teetering on civil war, while Iran and the PLO (Palestinian Authority) are facing their own popular revolts. 
   
   
   DISSIDENTS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Document of the Week #5 Qaddafi's Borderless Wrath

Facing what may be the most serious challenge to his reign since seizing power in 1969, Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi is, not surprisingly, lashing out at his opposition with a great deal of force, with reports of snipers, mercenaries, and the military all being deployed to smash those aligned against him. This is keeping with Kaddafi's style which at one time included dispatching his security and intelligence apparatus abroad to hunt down and eliminate exile opposition and to monitor the Libyan diaspora in order to thwart and deter the formation of threats to his regime.

This Document of the Week is a 12/15/1993 Counterterrorist Center Commentary from the Director of Central Intelligence’s Counterterrorist Center regarding the disappearance of Mansur Kikhia who was mostly likely abducted by Libyan security services while in Cairo for a meeting of a Arab human rights group and with members of his family. Mansur Kikhia's disappearance has never been resolved, nor have many of the assassinations and vanishings of other exiled Libyan leaders, activists, and opponents of Qaddafi's regime.  

If Qaddafi survive, inevitably those opposing him will be driven into exile and likely hunted in a renewed effort to stamp out diasporic opposition to the Libyan dictator. 

12/15/1993 CIA Report Regarding Mansur Kikhia

NSA Stands Alone- In Respecting Jack Anderson's Rights

Despite calling attention to their GAMMA GUPY operation which eavesdropped on the mobile phone calls of Politburo leaders, it seems the National Security Agency was able to respect the rights of Jack Anderson and not engage in illegal surveillance of him at any time, even at the height of its pre-911 disregard for American rights. In contrast, the FBI and the CIA both stalked Anderson during his career, often on the flimsiest of pretexts.(1)

In response to a FOIA request I had submitted on my behalf, the NSA sent the following final response. In the letter, the NSA makes the rare concession that it indeed had records pertaining to Jack Anderson and even described them. According to the NSA, the records are “foreign intelligence reports dating from the late 1960s and early 1970s. They contain only references to news articles written by Jack Anderson: they are not “about” him, nor was he the target of any collection.”

While I'm annoyed at the NSA's FOIA office for recently demanding fees for a record cited in an NSA publication, my dealings with them leave no doubt in my mind of their forthrightness.

Jack Anderson NSA letter

(1) All information not from the letter comes from Mark Feldstein's Poisoning the Press and I will add more detailed footnotes once I retrieve my copy tomorrow. 

CIA Will "Neither Confirm nor Deny" Planning to Kill WikiLeaks Founder

Recently, I FOIAed the Central Intelligence Agency seeking “copies of all records [for] current or previous plans to assassinate Julian Assange, Australian national and spokesman for Wikileaks.org. Again, despite my prior experience with the CIA refusing to confirm or deny a plot to kill Glenn Beck, I honestly expected the CIA to issue a firm “no records” response to my request. Again, I was shocked at the response I did receive.

The CIA invoked the “Glomar” response and has chosen to “neither confirm nor deny” any records pertaining to any CIA plot to kill Julian Assange on the grounds that such records, if they exist, “is intelligence sources and methods information that is protected from disclosure”

Honestly, I do not believe the theories going around claiming the CIA is out to get Assange or has anything to do with his residence problems in Sweden or the molestation and rape allegations he faces there. However, in light of the dubious decisions to employ Glomar in response to this request and Obama's proclamation that he has the right to assassinate Americans without judicial review makes me less sympathetic to CIA complaints of being misunderstood or portrayed in a bad light by conspiracy theories.

CIA Response to Assange Assassination FOIA

The Lack of a Post- Milosevic NIE and What it Means

Without a doubt, once Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown, the American focus on the former Yugoslavia rapidly began to wane. This trend was furthered by the timing of Milosevic’s overthrow which occurred just a month before the 2000 American elections which eventually brought George W. Bush and a stated disdain for both the American interventions in the Balkans specifically and nation-building more generally into power. 9-11 accelerated the disengagement and made it permanent.


Confirming this is a final response letter recently sent out by the CIA in which they admit to having created no National Intelligence Estimates between 10/2000 and 10/2001 on Serbia or the rump Yugoslavia. NIEs are described by the CIA as being, “the most authoritative written judgment concerning a national security issue prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence” and “are addressed to the highest level of policymakers-up to and including the President.” The creation of a NIE indicates significant interest from senior American leaders. While the lack of a NIE does not mean a total disengagement from an issue, it does indicate a less priority and importance has been placed upon it
 
CIA No Record Response

America has a Communist -style Education Funding System & Other More Serious Things About Yugoslav Students

This is a CIA study of Yugoslav university students and youth written in the summer of 1968 according to 5/7/1973 Memorandum to the DCI regarding the broader report this paper of which this document was a portion. This document was reported to exist when the CIA released its infamous "Crown Jewels" collection I have a limited amount of time, so I am only going to hit the report’s highlights:

A)The report notes the age range of the Partisan generation which at the time of the report range from the leadership like Tito being well into their seventies and eighties while at the tail end there were individuals still in their forties. (pg.4)

B)Interestingly, Yugoslav schools and American schools are funded via the same primary means- local taxes. Just like in America, areas of Yugoslavia with high levels of wealth had high quality schools, while economically disadvantaged areas had inferior educational opportunities (pg.9)

A personal note, I intend to criticize everyone I know who mindlessly favors local control of education as being a "Commie" and by citing this report.

C)Something else I found noteworthy- Yugoslavia reduced the student loan burdens of university students who rapidly completed their studies. Given the white hot mess that Yugoslav higher education come be, it’s not easy to say if that was a good idea or would be a good idea in the United States, but I think it might be worthwhile to examine it as a student loan reform here in the United States. (pg.9)

D)Finally, the students of Sarajevo rioted along with the students of Belgrade. (pg.10)

A CIA 1968 Study of Yugoslav Youth

A Real LIfe Burn Notice: Krunoslav Draganovic's Burn Notice

My favorite show is Burn Notice. The premise of the show is that the lead character, a former CIA spy named Michael Westen, was "burnt" (a burnt spy is one who is fired and transformed into a pariah) as part of an effort to recruit him into a still unknown or unknown covert conspiracy against enemies and enemies unknown. As of about midway through season four, Westen has made some progress in discovering in why he was burnt, who burnt him, and why he was burnt.

The title of the show Burn Notice comes from the document issued when a spy of individual is burnt by the intelligence community. A Burn Notice is issued when a person proves untrustworthy, dangerous to the American intelligence community after previously worthy, or just becomes a dangerous nuisance. Below is a US Army CIC “burn notice” for Krunoslav Draganovic, a Croatian priest, member of the Ustasha movement, and US Army CIC asset directed against Yugoslavia during the early portion of the Cold War. Draganovic will initially come to US Army CIC attention during the early days of the Cold War. He was evacuating members of the Ustasha movement from Europe to destinations such as Argentina. Later, Draganovic was employed by the US Army to evacuate Klaus Barbie from Europe. Eventually, Draganovic became a target of US intelligence and an asset for the US Army CIC. (*)

That was true until 1962 as shown by this Burn Notice, Krunoslav Draganovic was burnt by the US Army CIC for reasons of security, demands of support for his fellow Croatian terrorists, and simply not being controllable. While his activities were still monitored by American intelligence, he ceased to be a source.

Krunoslav Draganovic's Burn Notice

(*) This post is based off of reports in Draganovic's CIA Name File, Paul Hockenos' Homeland Calling, and John Loftus and Mark Aarons' Unholy Trinity.

CIA Denies Request for Records Given to 9-11 Commission

In his book, Marching Toward Hell: America and Islam after Iraq, Michael Scheuer provides a tantalizing glimpse into a collection of documents that he provided to the 9-11 Commission that details the American response to the threat posed by Al-Qaeda. Naturally, I immediately had them FOIAed for and eagerly awaited the CIA's response.

I was informed that the CIA's response was very negative. You can see for yourself that the CIA not only invoked the operational exemption to FOIA requests given to it by the CIA Information Act of 1984, they would not even confirm that the files existed. Nor did they give leave to appeal their decision. Overall, a total FOIA block.

P.S. I included the pages from Marching Toward Hell in which Scheuer describes the files on the off-chance that someone else wants to submit a FOIA request.

CIA Shoot Down Scheuer FOIA

Hunter S. Thompson Did Not Have a CIA File

A while back, I sought out Hunter Thompson's CIA file. According to the final response posted below, Thompson did not draw the attention of the CIA. Odd.

CIA Final Response Letter RE Hunter Thompson